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We analyse the computational complexity of the recently proposed ideal semantics within
both abstract argumentation frameworks (afs) and assumption-based argumentation
frameworks (abfs). It is shown that while typically less tractable than credulous admissibi-
lity semantics, the natural decision problems arising with this extension-based model can,
perhaps surprisingly, be decided more eﬃciently than sceptical preferred semantics. In
particular the task of ﬁnding the unique ideal extension is easier than that of deciding if a
given argument is accepted under the sceptical semantics. We provide eﬃcient algorithmic
approaches for the class of bipartite argumentation frameworks and, ﬁnally, present a
number of technical results which offer strong indications that typical problems in ideal
argumentation are complete for the class pC‖ of languages decidable by polynomial time
algorithms allowed to make non-adaptive queries to a C oracle, where C is an upper
bound on the computational complexity of deciding credulous acceptance: C = np for afs
and logic programming (lp) instantiations of abfs; C = Σ p2 for abfs modelling default
theories.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Argumentation models have provided a fruitful source of ideas and technologies within both theoretical studies and
applications of AI. A recent overview of these contributions may be found in the survey of Bench-Capon and Dunne [2].
Two important models which have received considerable attention over the last ten years are the abstract argumentation
frameworks (afs) of Dung [12] and the related assumption based frameworks (abfs) of Bondarenko et al. [4]. Both ap-
proaches provide interpretations for intuitive notions of “collection of justiﬁed arguments” as subsets satisfying particular
criteria with respect to the underlying framework. In Dung’s model the concept of “argument” is regarded as an atomic
entity whose principal feature of interest concerns those other arguments with which it is incompatible (such incompat-
ibility being described by the so-called attack relation). The formalism adopted in Bondarenko et al. develops a rationale
capturing incompatibility by treating an argument’s structure in terms of an assertion which is the outcome of a formal
derivation process within some logical theory. In this way two arguments are incompatible if the assertion supported by
one is inconsistent with the premises from which the other is derived.
Importing terminology from non-monotonic logic – one of the early and still important application domains of argumen-
tation techniques – collections of justiﬁed arguments (in both schemes) are referred to as extensions. A variety of different
semantics deﬁning the criteria that a set must satisfy in order to constitute an extension of a particular form have been
proposed, e.g. grounded, preferred, and stable. With respect to such semantics speciﬁc arguments may be viewed as credu-
lously accepted (a member of at least one set sanctioned by the semantics) or sceptically accepted (a member of every set
sanctioned by the semantics).
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1560 P.E. Dunne / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 1559–1591Fig. 1. (a) Empty grounded extension; w sceptically preferred. (b) Empty grounded extension; w sceptically preferred.
The extension based semantics deﬁned by ideal extensions were introduced by Dung et al. [14,15] as an alternative scepti-
cal basis for deﬁning collections of justiﬁed arguments in the frameworks promoted by Dung [12] and Bondarenko et al. [4].
An important property of this approach is that the ideal extension is uniquely deﬁned. The grounded extension also has the
property of being unique, however, there are a number of cases where requiring membership in the grounded extension as
a condition of acceptability can be too restrictive, e.g. there are frameworks for which the grounded extension is empty, but
using different criteria the same frameworks have a non-empty set of acceptable arguments. One such semantics is offered
by considering the set of so-called sceptically preferred arguments. In informal terms, a preferred extension is a maximal in-
ternally consistent set of arguments that defends itself against any attack, so that the sceptically preferred arguments are
those that occur in every preferred extension. From a semantic viewpoint one issue with sceptically preferred acceptability
is that although the set of such arguments is unique, collectively this set may fail to be justiﬁable, i.e. in principle while
less restrictive than the grounded extension, the set of sceptically preferred arguments could be seen as being insuﬃciently
restrictive. As a very simple example consider the two frameworks presented in Fig. 1.
Both have an empty grounded extension and exactly two preferred extensions – the sets {x,w} and {y,w} – so that w
is sceptically preferred in each. The intuition underpinning ideal semantics stems from the difference between these two
frameworks: that the attack 〈w, z〉 is present in Fig. 1(b) and absent from Fig. 1(a). In Fig. 1(a), {w} must rely on either
x or y to defend against the attack by z, however the set {w} provides no information about which of x or y speciﬁc
viewpoints might endorse in order to accept w . In Fig. 1(b), w is self-defending, so that no explicit choice between x and y
has to be made in order to justify w as acceptable. By deﬁning the notion of maximal collection of acceptable arguments in
terms of “maximal set of sceptically preferred arguments that can defend itself against attack”, the ideal semantics provides
a mechanism for differentiating these two frameworks: Fig. 1(a) has an empty ideal extension; in Fig. 1(b) the ideal ex-
tension is {w}. In total the ideal semantics offer an intermediate status between the sometimes overly restrictive sceptical
requirements of grounded extensions and the potentially too generous provision of being sceptically preferred.
Deﬁning acceptability via ideal extensions offers some semantic advantages, the question arises, however, as to the
computational cost incurred by these gains: membership in the grounded extension can be decided eﬃciently follows from
Dung [12] whereas deciding if a given argument is sceptically preferred is Π p2 -complete from Dunne and Bench-Capon [19].
Thus, our principal concern in this article is in classifying the computational complexity of a number of natural problems
related to ideal semantics in both the abstract argumentation frameworks of Dung [12] and the assumption-based approach
of Bondarenko et al. [4]: thereby addressing a question raised in the study of ideal semantics presented in Dung et al. [15].
In total our results present a complexity-theoretic analysis of ideal semantics of a similar level of detail to that which has
already been achieved for the more widely studied preferred and stable semantics, e.g. in the work of Dimopoulos and
Torres [11], Dunne and Bench-Capon [19,20], Dimopoulos, Nebel and Toni [8–10] and Dunne [16].
The problems we consider include both decision questions and those related to the construction of the ideal extension.
Thus,
a. Given an argument x is it accepted under the ideal semantics?
b. Given a set of arguments, S
b1. Is S , itself, an ideal set? i.e. an admissible set of sceptically preferred arguments.
b2. Is S the ideal extension? i.e. the maximal ideal set.
c. Is the ideal extension empty?
d. Does the ideal extension coincide with the set of all sceptically preferred arguments?
e. Given an af or abf, construct its ideal extension.
For the case of afs and ﬂat abfs with credulous reasoning problems decidable in some complexity class C , we obtain bounds
for these problems ranging from C-hard, coC-hard, and hardness within various so-called difference classes, e.g. dp the class
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exact fpC‖ -completeness classiﬁcation for the construction problem deﬁned in (e).
These preliminary results leave a gap between lower (hardness) bounds and upper bounds for a number of the decision
questions. We subsequently present strong evidence that problems (a), (b2) and (c) are not contained in any complexity
class strictly below pC‖ : speciﬁcally that all of these problems are pC‖ -hard via randomised reductions which are correct with
probability approaching 1.
We review relevant concepts from computational complexity theory in Section 2. In the remainder of this paper, back-
ground deﬁnitions are given in Section 3.1 together with formal deﬁnitions of the problems introduced in (a)–(e) above.
Within Section 3 we concentrate on complexity and algorithmic properties of afs.1 In Section 3.2, two technical lemmata are
given which characterise properties of ideal sets (Lemma 1) and of arguments belonging to the ideal extension (Lemma 2).
The complexity of decision questions is considered in Section 3.3 while Section 3.4 provides details of eﬃcient solution ap-
proaches for the special case of bipartite argumentation frameworks, a class whose properties have previously been studied
by Dunne [16]. Our main technical result for afs is presented in Section 3.5 wherein an exact classiﬁcation for the com-
plexity of ﬁnding the ideal extension is given. One consequence of this result is that (under the usual complexity-theoretic
assumptions) constructing the ideal extension of a given argumentation framework is, in general, easier than deciding if one
of its arguments is sceptically accepted. In Section 3.6 we apply a number of techniques originating from work of Chang et
al. [6,7] and Valiant and Vazirani [34] which provide strong evidence that the upper bounds resulting from Section 3.5 are
optimal.
We then, in Section 4, turn our attention to complexity questions as they arise for ideal semantics in assumption-based
frameworks, thus extending the range of known complexity properties for abfs from the pioneering studies of Dimopoulos,
Nebel and Toni in [8–10]. In Section 4.1 we review the basic elements of abfs and the formulation of analogues to concepts
in afs given earlier in Section 3.1. We then recall the translations of divers non-monotonic reasoning systems – amongst
which we focus on Logic Programming (lp) and Default Logic (dl) – as originally presented in Bondarenko et al. [4]. The
complexity of decision problems in the ideal semantics for a number of such settings is considered in Section 4.3. Concluding
remarks are presented in Section 5.
2. Review of background from computational complexity
In informal terms the ﬁeld of computational complexity is concerned with classifying computational problems in terms
of the resources required to solve them. Typical resources of interest being the time or memory used by an algorithm. The
most commonly studied formulation of “computational problem” treats these as so-called decision problems (or languages)
whereby given an instance of the problem it is required to decide if this instance has some property of interest, i.e. is
a member of the language. For example, instances of cnf-sat – Satisﬁability of Conjunctive Normal Form formulae – are
deﬁned by a collection of m clauses over literals from a set of propositional variables: instances are accepted if there is an
assignment to the variables that results in every clause having at least one literal evaluating to . A central objective of
this ﬁeld is to distinguish decision problems for which eﬃcient algorithms exist from those for which no such approach
is possible. Conventionally, the class of eﬃciently decidable problems is viewed as those for which: there is a constant k
and a deterministic2 algorithm, guaranteed correctly to decide the status of any instance represented in n bits, that takes at
most nk steps. The complexity class p (polynomial time) comprises the set of all decision problems for which such algorithms
exist.
No polynomial time algorithm has been found for the decision problem cnf-sat, even if instances are constrained to use
at most three literals per clause (3-cnf) – the decision problem 3-sat. Satisﬁability has the property that possible witnesses
are easy to check, i.e. given an assignment α for some cnf, ϕ(Z), there is a polynomial time procedure which decides
if α does indeed satisfy ϕ(Z). The complexity class np is characterised by those decision problems, L, for which: there is
a polynomial time decidable binary witness relation, WL , associating instances, x of size n, with witnesses y in such a way
that x is accepted as an instance of L if and only if 〈x, y〉 ∈ WL . For example with L = 3− sat, we have 〈ϕ(Z),α〉 ∈ W3-sat if
and only if α is a satisfying assignment for ϕ(Z). The concept of witness relations allows np to be formulated as the set of
the decision problems that may be expressed in the form (x ∈ L) ⇔ ∃y: 〈x, y〉 ∈ WL with WL ∈ p. Similarly, if coL denotes
the set of instances which are not in L – the so-called complement of L – the complexity class conp contains those decision
problems L for which coL ∈ np.
Generalising from binary relationships to (k+ 1)-ary relations gives rise to the further complexity classes Σ pk and Π pk as
those decision problems, L, expressed in the form
(x ∈ L) ⇔ Qk ykQk−1yk−1 · · · Q 2 y2Q 1 y1〈x, y1, y2, . . . , yk〉 ∈ WL (1)
where Q i ∈ {∃,∀}, Q i 
= Q i+1. When Qk = ∃ (respectively ∀) the corresponding class is denoted by Σ pk (respectively, Π pk ).
The collection
⋃∞
k=0Σ
p
k (=
⋃∞
k=0Π
p
k ) is called the Polynomial Hierarchy (ph).
1 The results in this section have been reported in Dunne [17]: the current article includes full proofs of these together with their development to abf
settings.
2 In informal terms, “deterministic” here means that the exact sequence of steps executed by the algorithm on a given input is predetermined.
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p
k we have the so-called quantiﬁed satisﬁability problems – qsat
Σ
k and
qsatΠk – whose instances are 3-cnf formulae deﬁned on k disjoint sets of n propositional variables – X1, X2, . . . , Xk – so
that
ϕ ∈ qsatΣk ⇔
{∃α1∀α2 · · · ∃αk−1∀αk ϕ(α1,α2, . . . ,αk)= ⊥ (k even)
vs∃α1∀α2 · · · ∀αk−1∃αk ϕ(α1,α2, . . . ,αk)=  (k odd)
ϕ ∈ qsatΠk ⇔
{∀α1∃α2 · · · ∀αk−1∃αk ϕ(α1,α2, . . . ,αk)=  (k even)
∀α1∃α2 · · · ∃αk−1∀αk ϕ(α1,α2, . . . ,αk)= ⊥ (k odd)
An equivalent formulation of the various levels of ph is derived by using the concept of oracle computations. Consider the
class of the problems that are decidable in polynomial time subject to the assumption that we may decide 3-sat instances
in a single step.3 The resulting relativised complexity class is denoted p3-sat and, more generally when methods for arbitrary
np problems are used, the corresponding complexity class is denoted pnp: in fact, for reasons we outline subsequently
in this overview, these classes contain exactly the same decision problems, i.e. p3-sat = pnp . Oracle complexity may also
be deﬁned with classes other than p (for the “base” class) and np (for the oracle source). Noting this and the quantiﬁer
pattern in (1), it is not hard to see that Σ pk+1 ≡ npΣ
p
k ; Π pk+1 ≡ conpΣ
p
k ≡ coΣ pk+1. It is sometimes helpful, e.g. as in the
context of results from Section 4, to consider complexity classes of the form ce where e is itself a relativised class. For
example conpnp
C
contains decision problems whose complement can be decided by np computations provided with access
to an oracle in npC . Typically such constructs are used to express generic upper bounds based on the complexity of some
supporting problem known to belong to C .
Oracle complexity classes are, however, more than just an alternative approach to deﬁning ph: these also provide a
formalism by which a rather more ﬁne-grained study of decision problems falling between np∪ conp and Σ p2 ∪Π p2 can be
carried out. For example, dp is the class of decision problems whose positive instances are characterised as those belonging
to L1 ∩ L2 where L1 ∈ np and L2 ∈ conp. This class can be interpreted as those decision problems which may be solved by a
polynomial time algorithm which is allowed to make at most two calls upon an np oracle. An important (presumed) subset
of pnp is deﬁned by distinguishing whether oracle calls are adaptive – i.e. the exact formulation of the next oracle query may
be dependent on the answers received to previous questions – or whether such queries are non-adaptive, i.e. the form of the
questions to be put to the oracle is predetermined allowing all of these to be performed in parallel. The latter class, which
we denote pnp‖ , has been considered in Wagner [36,37], Jenner and Toran [26].4 Under the standard complexity-theoretic
assumptions, it is conjectured that,
p⊂
{
np
co-np
}
⊂ dp ⊂ pnp‖ ⊂ pnp ⊂
{
Σ
p
2
Π
p
2
}
⊂ pΣ
p
2‖ ⊂ pΣ
p
2 ⊂
{
Σ
p
3
Π
p
3
}
· · ·
In many applications the principal concern is less with decision properties and rather more on function problems, e.g. given
an instance of 3-sat rather than simply determine if it is satisﬁable, one wishes to construct a satisfying assignment (if one
exists). Analogously to the decision problem complexity classes outlined above one may deﬁne associated function classes,
e.g. fp is the class of function problems that can be solved by polynomial time algorithms (where “polynomial” is in terms
of the number of bits representing both input and output). The main body of this article considers the function classes fp
and fpnp‖ , i.e. the functional analogues of the classes p and pnp‖ . For a decision problem d, the notation fd will denote a
related function problem.5
To conclude we review the notion of “reducibility” between problems and the important concept of “complete problem”
within a complexity class. Given two decision problems f and g , f is said to be polynomially many-one reducible to g
(denoted f pm g) if there is a procedure, τ ∈ fp, transforming instances x of f to instances τ (x) of y in such a way that x is
accepted as an instance of f if and only if τ (x) is accepted as an instance of g , e.g. cnf-satpm 3-sat since an arbitrary cnf
formula ϕ(Z) can be transformed (in polynomial time) to a 3-cnf ψ(Z ∪W ) (W being a new set of propositional variables)
with ψ(Z ∪ W ) satisﬁable if and only if ϕ(Z) is so. By focusing on polynomial time transformations, a consequence of
the property f pm g is that g ∈ p implies f ∈ p also. This notion of reducibility thereby affords a powerful tool by which
evidence that one complexity class is strictly contained within another may be obtained. Suppose C is some complexity
class, e.g. np, conp, etc. A decision problem, g , is said to be hard for the class C (or simply, C-hard) if ∀ f ∈ C f pm g: in
consequence if g is C-hard and g ∈ p then C ⊆ p. If g ∈ C in addition to being C-hard then g is said to be C-complete.
It should be noted that “hardness” is, strictly speaking, with respect to the reducibility relation (pm in our examples).
Polynomial time many-one reducibility is only one of a number of such relations that have been studied: we refer the
3 For example, such methods could construct a 3-cnf, ϕ , call the 3-sat “oracle” to discover whether ϕ is satisﬁable and use the response to determine
the next computation step.
4 A variety of notations has been used in the literature for the classes pnp and pnp‖ : the former is often denoted Δ
p
2 ; the latter Θ
p
2 . A valuable overview
of AI related work concerning Θ p2 is presented by Eiter and Gottlob [23].
5 One complication is that a given instance of a problem, e.g. cnf formula, may have a number of different solutions, i.e. satisfying assignments, so that
the exact formulation of fsat requires some care. For the particular function problem of interest in this article – that of constructing the ideal extension –
this issue does not arise.
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Decision problems in afs.
Problem name Instance Question
Veriﬁcation (vers) H(X ,A); S ⊆X Is S ∈ Es(H)?
Credulous Acceptance (cas) H(X ,A); x ∈X ∃S ∈ Es(H) for which x ∈ S?
Sceptical Acceptance (sas) H(X ,A); x ∈X ∀T ∈ Es(H) is x ∈ T ?
Existence (existss) H(X ,A) Is Es(H) 
= ∅?
Emptiness (ver∅s ) H(X ,A) Is Es(H) = {∅}?
reader to the work of Ladner, Lynch and Selman [29] for more detailed discussion. Unless explicitly stated otherwise the
hardness results derived in this paper are all with respect to pm .6 The concept of hard and complete problems, with some
appropriate technical adjustments, also extends to function complexity classes. With respect to the range of complexity
classes introduced earlier in this section 3-sat is np-complete (and its complement, unsat, conp-complete); qsatΣk is Σ
p
k -
complete (and its complement, qsatΠk , is Π
p
k -complete). For the oracle class, d
p , the problem sat-unsat whose instances
are pairs of 3-cnf formulae 〈Φ1,Φ2〉 accepted if Φ1 is satisﬁable and Φ2 is unsatisﬁable has been shown to be dp-complete,
see e.g. Papadimitriou [32, p. 413].
3. Abstract argumentation frameworks
3.1. Background and review of af concepts
The following concepts were introduced in Dung [12].
Deﬁnition 1. An argumentation framework (af) is a pair H= 〈X ,A〉, in which X is a ﬁnite set of arguments and A⊂X ×X
is the attack relationship for H. A pair 〈x, y〉 ∈ A is referred to as ‘y is attacked by x’ or ‘x attacks y’. For R , S subsets of
arguments in the af H(X ,A), we say that s ∈ S is attacked by R – written attacks(R, s) – if there is some r ∈ R such that
〈r, s〉 ∈ A. For subsets R and S of X we write attacks(R, S) if there is some s ∈ S for which attacks(R, s) holds; x ∈ X is
acceptable with respect to S if for every y ∈ X that attacks x there is some z ∈ S that attacks y. A subset, S , is conﬂict-free
if no argument in S is attacked by any other argument in S . A conﬂict-free set S is admissible if every y ∈ S is acceptable
w.r.t. S and S is a preferred extension if it is a maximal (with respect to ⊆) admissible set. A subset, S , is a stable extension
if S is conﬂict free and every y /∈ S is attacked by S . An af, H is coherent if every preferred extension in H is also a stable
extension. The grounded extension of 〈X ,A〉 is the subset of X obtained by iterating the following process: given S ⊆ X ,
let F(S) be the set of arguments acceptable to S . Letting F0(S) denote S and F i+1(S) = F(F i(S)) (i  0), the grounded
extension of 〈X ,A〉 is the least ﬁxed point of F(∅), i.e. the set of arguments Fk(∅) where k is the smallest value satisfying
Fk(∅)=Fk+1(∅). Dung [12] shows that the grounded extension is well-deﬁned and unique.
Dung et al. [14,15] introduce the ideal semantics: the subset S is an ideal set of H if S is admissible and a subset of every
preferred extension of H; S is the ideal extension if it is the maximal such set.7
An af is cohesive if its ideal extension coincides with the intersection of its preferred extensions.8
For S ⊆X ,
S− =def {p: ∃q ∈ S such that 〈p,q〉 ∈A}
S+ =def {p: ∃q ∈ S such that 〈q, p〉 ∈A}
The various semantics motivate the general decision problems of Table 1 that have been considered by Dimopoulos and
Torres [11] and Dunne and Bench-Capon [19] w.r.t. afs and Dimopoulos et al. [8–10] in abfs. Subsequently s denotes one
of the (extension) type semantics {adm,pr,st,gr,idl,ie} corresponding to admissible sets, preferred, stable, and grounded
extensions, ideal sets, and the ideal extension.9 For a given semantics s and af, H(X ,A) we use Es to denote the set of
all subsets of X that satisfy the conditions speciﬁed by s. Informally, the canonical decision problems are Veriﬁcation (ver),
Credulous Acceptance (ca) and Sceptical Acceptance (sa), so that for example vers , refers to the decision problem of verifying
that a given set of arguments satisﬁes the conditions of the semantics s, i.e. that the set is in the collection Es . The formal
deﬁnitions of these problems for afs are presented in Table 1.
6 The exceptions, e.g. Corollary 5(b), use so-called “randomised reductions”: these are discussed later in the paper.
7 Dung et al. [14,15] show that there is a unique maximal ideal set in every af, abf.
8 The term cohesive is introduced here: although the concept is deﬁned in Dung et al. [14,15], no explicit terminology is used to describe such frame-
works therein.
9 These, of course, are far from exhaustive: in addition to the ideal semantics with which the present paper is concerned, our selection is intended to
cover the principal cases for which complexity-theoretic issues have been addressed.
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Computational complexity w.r.t. semantics s.
s vers cas sas exists ver∅s
adm p [12] np-c [11] Trivial [12] Trivial [12] conp-c [11]
pr conp-c [11] np-c [11] Π p2 -c [19] Trivial [12] conp-c [11]
st p [12] np-c [11] conp-c/dp-c np-c [11] Trivial
gr p [12] p [12] p [12] Trivial [12] p [12]
Fig. 2. The argumentation framework HΦ .
In order to avoid excessive repetition, when we subsequently refer to an argument x as credulously accepted, unless
explicitly stated otherwise, this is with respect to admissibility, i.e. caadm . Similarly “sceptically accepted” should be under-
stood as with respect to preferred extensions, i.e. sapr .
Table 2 summarises known complexity results w.r.t. these problems.
Remarks.
1. For a complexity class C , C − c denotes C-completeness.
2. Cases which are described as “trivial” are either those for which the property in question always holds such as existence
of preferred extensions, or for which it never holds (or holds only in extreme cases), e.g. the set of stable extensions
for 〈X ,A〉 is {∅} if and only if X = ∅.
3. The two distinct classiﬁcations for sast arise from the two possible interpretations of sceptical acceptance w.r.t. stable
extensions for afs without any, i.e. if one regards x ∈⋂S∈st(H) S as holding even when Est(H) = ∅ then the decision
problem is conp-complete (Dimopoulos and Torres [11] via commentary of Dunne and Bench-Capon [19, p. 189]). If,
however, one requires H to have at least one stable extension as a precondition for x to be sceptically accepted the
decision problem becomes dp-complete.10
A number of our subsequent constructions adapt what we shall refer to as the standard translation of a cnf to an af. Given a
cnf formula Φ(Zn) =∧mj=1 C j with each C j a disjunction of literals from {z1, . . . , zn,¬z1, . . . ,¬zn}, the standard translation
of Φ is the af HΦ(X ,A) with
X = {Φ,C1, . . . ,Cm} ∪ {zi,¬zi: 1 i  n}
A= {〈C j,Φ〉: 1 j m}∪ {〈zi,¬zi〉, 〈¬zi, zi〉: 1 i  n}∪ {〈zi,C j〉: zi occurs in C j}
∪ {〈¬zi,C j〉: ¬zi occurs in C j}
Fig. 2 illustrates HΦ .
Fact 1. (See Dimopoulos and Torres [11].) LetΦ(Zn) be an instance of cnf-sat, i.e. a cnf formula. ThenΦ(Zn) is satisﬁable if and only
if ca(HΦ(X ,A),Φ).
We consider a number of decision problems relating to properties of ideal extensions in argumentation frameworks as
described in Table 3.
We also examine the function problem ﬁe in which given an af it is required to return its ideal extension.
We prove the following complexity classiﬁcations.
10 A proof of this result may be found in Dunne and Wooldridge [21].
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Decision questions for ideal semantics.
Problem name Instance Question
A. veridl H(X ,A); S ⊆X Is S an ideal set?
B. verie H(X ,A); S ⊆X Is S the ideal extension?
C. ver∅ie H(X ,A) Is the ideal extension empty?
D. caidl H(X ,A); x ∈X Is x in the ideal extension?
E. cs H(X ,A) Is H(X ,A) cohesive?
a. veridl is conp-complete.
b. caidl is conp-hard via pm-reducibility.
c. ver∅ie is np-hard via 
p
m-reducibility.
d. verie is dp-hard via pm-reducibility.
e. cs is Σ p2 -complete.
f. ﬁe is fpnp‖ -complete.
g. Problems (A)–(E) of Table 3 and ﬁe are polynomial time solvable for bipartite frameworks.
h. Problems (B)–(E) of Table 3 are pnp‖ -complete via randomised reductions.
3.2. Characteristic properties of ideal sets
The upper bound proofs exploit a characterisation of ideal sets in terms of credulous acceptability presented in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 gives a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a given argument to be a member of the ideal extension.
Lemma 1. Let H(X ,A) be an af and S ⊆X . Then S deﬁnes an ideal set of H if and only if both of the conditions below are satisﬁed:
I1. S ∈ Eadm(H), i.e. S is an admissible set of arguments in H.
I2. For every argument p ∈ S− , there is no admissible set of H that contains p, i.e. ∀p ∈ S− ¬caadm(H, p).
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that S ⊆ X is an ideal set of H. It is immediate from the deﬁnition of ideal set that S is admissible
so (I1) holds. Furthermore, were it the case that (I2) failed to hold, then there would be some admissible set, T , for which
T ∩ S− 
= ∅, and thus some preferred extension, R , with R ∩ S− 
= ∅. For this preferred extension, however, one cannot have
S ⊆ R , thereby contradicting the assumption that S is an ideal set.
(⇐) Let S be an admissible set for which no argument in S− is credulously accepted. We show that S is a subset
of every preferred extension of H and, thus, an ideal set. Consider any preferred extension R . We ﬁrst claim that S ∪ R
must be conﬂict free: the only way in which this could fail to be true is if there are arguments s ∈ S and r ∈ R such that
〈r, s〉 ∈ A or 〈s, r〉 ∈ A. In the former case r ∈ S− which contradicts the assumption that no argument in S− is credulously
accepted. In the latter case, since R is a preferred extension, there must be some argument q ∈ R that defends r against the
attack by s, i.e. 〈q, s〉 ∈ A and q ∈ R: again this gives q ∈ S− and would contradict the assumption that no argument in S−
were credulously accepted. The set S ∪ R is thus conﬂict-free. It is, furthermore, admissible: any argument in X attacking
S ∪ R either attacks an argument in S (and so is counterattacked by an argument in S since S is admissible) or attacks an
argument in R (and, again, is counterattacked by an argument in R since R is a preferred extension). The set R , however, is
a maximal admissible set and thus S ∪ R = R , i.e. S ⊆ R as required. 
Lemma 2. Let H(X ,A) be an af and let M ⊆ X be its ideal extension. Then x ∈ M if and only if both of the conditions below are
satisﬁed:
M1. No attacker of x is credulously accepted, i.e. ∀y ∈ {x}− ¬caadm(H, y).
M2. For each attacker y of x, at least one attacker z of y is in M, i.e. ∀y ∈ {x}−: {y}− ∩M 
= ∅.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that x ∈ M. Since M is an ideal set, from Lemma 1, no attacker of M can be credulously accepted
and, in particular, no attacker of x can be credulously accepted. Any such attack must, however, be counterattacked by at
least one argument of M since M is admissible. The only available counterattacks on y ∈ {x}− are those in the set {y}− ,
hence {y}− ∩M 
= ∅.
(⇐) Suppose that x ∈ X is such that no attacker of x is credulously accepted and that for each such attacker, y, some
counterattacker, z of y is in M. We show that M ∪ {x} forms an ideal set, from which it follows that x ∈ M since M is
maximal. Consider the set M ∪ {x}. To see that M ∪ {x} is admissible, ﬁrst observe that it is conﬂict-free: if, for p ∈ M,
we have 〈p, x〉 ∈A then p is credulously accepted (by the admissibility of M) contradicting the property (M1); similarly if
〈x, p〉 ∈A for some p ∈M then as M is admissible we ﬁnd q ∈M with 〈q, x〉 ∈A resulting in a similar contradiction. Thus
M ∪ {x} is conﬂict-free. This set, however, also defends itself against any attack. For consider any argument y that attacks
M ∪ {x}: either y attacks M and so is counterattacked by some z ∈ M; alternatively y attacks x. Now since y ∈ {x}− we
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from Lemma 1 that no attacker of M is credulously accepted. From the properties assumed of x, it is also the case that no
attacker of x is credulously accepted. It follows that M ∪ {x} is an admissible set none of whose attackers is credulously
accepted, i.e. from Lemma 1, M ∪ {x} is an ideal set. The set M is, however, already maximal so that M ∪ {x} = M, i.e.
x ∈M as required. 
3.3. Preliminary complexity results on ideal semantics in afs
In this section we derive some initial results on the complexity of the decision problems for ideal semantics described
in Table 3. In a number of cases these leave a gap between upper and lower bounds, however, the constructions form the
basis for the analyses of Section 3.6 in which approaches to obtaining exact classiﬁcations are developed.
Theorem 1.
a. veridl is conp-complete.
b. caidl is conp-hard.
c. ver∅ie is np-hard.
d. verie is dp-hard.
Proof. For (a), an instance 〈H(X ,A), S〉 of the complementary problem can be checked by testing
¬veradm(H, S)∨
∨
q∈S−
caadm(H,q)
Correctness follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that caadm(H,q) is decidable in np. Since its complement is in np it follows
that veridl ∈ conp.11
To prove veridl is conp-hard we reduce from unsat (without loss of generality, restricted to instances which are 3-cnf).
Given a 3-cnf formula
Φ(z1, . . . , zn)=
m∧
i=1
Ci =
m∧
i=1
(zi,1 ∨ zi,2 ∨ zi,3)
as an instance of unsat we form an instance 〈FΦ, S〉 of veridl as follows. First construct the standard translation of Φ , i.e.
the af HΦ described in Fig. 2. In this the argument Φ is credulously accepted if and only if Φ(Zn) is satisﬁable, i.e. Φ is
not credulously accepted if and only if Φ(Zn) is unsatisﬁable. The af, FΦ , is formed from HΦ by adding an argument Ψ
together with attacks{〈Ψ, zi〉, 〈Ψ,¬zi〉: 1 i  n}∪ {〈Φ,Ψ 〉, 〈Ψ,Φ〉}
The instance of veridl is completed by setting S = {Ψ }.
We claim 〈FΦ, {Ψ }〉 is accepted as an instance of veridl if and only if Φ is unsatisﬁable.
First observe that {Ψ } is an admissible set: its only attacker is the argument Φ which Ψ counterattacks. Thus, via
Lemma 1, in order to complete the proof it suﬃces to observe that
¬caadm(FΦ,Φ) ⇔ ¬caadm(HΦ,Φ) ⇔ unsat(Φ)
For (b) it suﬃces to note that 〈FΦ,Ψ 〉 deﬁnes a positive instance of caidl if and only if Φ(Zn) is unsatisﬁable. Similarly
(c) follows by observing that FΦ has an empty ideal extension if and only if Φ(Zn) is satisﬁable.
Finally, in order to prove (d), given 〈Φ1(Zn),Φ2(Yn)〉 as an instance of sat-unsat, form F〈Φ1,Φ2〉 as the af containing
the frameworks FΦ1 and FΦ2 where we use Ψ1 and Ψ2 to denote the arguments added to HΦ1 and HΦ2 respectively.
The instance 〈F〈Φ1,Φ2〉, {Ψ2}〉 of verie is accepted if and only if 〈Φ1,Φ2〉 is accepted as an instance of sat-unsat. To see
this note that there are exactly four possibilities for the ideal extension, M, of F〈Φ1,Φ2〉: M = ∅ (both Φ1 and Φ2 are
satisﬁable); M = {Ψ1,Ψ2} (neither formula is satisﬁable); M = {Ψ1} (Φ1 is unsatisﬁable and Φ2 is satisﬁable); M = {Ψ2}
(Φ1 is satisﬁable and Φ2 is unsatisﬁable). Only the ﬁnal case corresponds with the set given in the constructed instance. 
For the next result we use a variant of the construction in Dunne and Bench-Capon [19] whereby sapr is shown to be
Π
p
2 -complete using a reduction from qsat
Π
2 .
The af GΦ(W,B) is formed from the standard translation, HΦ(X ,A), of Φ(Yn, Zn), i.e. X ⊂W and A⊂ B, so that
W = {Φ,C1, . . . ,Cm} ∪ {b1,b2,b3} ∪ {yi,¬yi, zi,¬zi: 1 i  n}
11 The form
∨
q∈S− caadm(H,q) is equivalent to ∃T veradm(H, T )∧ (T ∩ S− 
= ∅) so that it is not necessary to use |S| distinct np tests.
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B = {〈C j,Φ〉: 1 j m}∪ {〈yi,¬yi〉, 〈¬yi, yi〉, 〈zi,¬zi〉, 〈¬zi, zi〉: 1 i  n}
∪ {〈yi,C j〉: yi occurs in C j}∪ {〈¬yi,C j〉: ¬yi occurs in C j}
∪ {〈zi,C j〉: zi occurs in C j}∪ {〈¬zi,C j〉: ¬zi occurs in C j}∪ {〈C j,C j〉: 1 j m}
∪ {〈Φ,b1〉, 〈Φ,b2〉, 〈Φ,b3〉, 〈b1,b2〉, 〈b2,b3〉, 〈b3,b1〉}∪ {〈b1, zi〉, 〈b1,¬zi〉: 1 i  n}
The af, GΦ produced from an instance Φ(Yn, Zn) is such that the argument Φ is sceptically preferred if and only if for
every assignment, αY of values to Yn there is some assignment, βZ of values to Zn for which Φ(αY , βZ )= .
The resulting af is shown in Fig. 3.
Fact 2. (See Dunne and Bench-Capon [19].)
a. Φ(Yn, Zn) is accepted as an instance of qsatΠ2 if and only if sa(GΦ,Φ).
b. Φ(Yn, Zn) is accepted as an instance of qsatΠ2 if and only if GΦ is coherent.
A subset, S , of the literals {z1, . . . , zn,¬z1, . . . ,¬zn} is said to be consistent (denoted cons(S)) if it contains at most one
of {zi,¬zi} for each 1 i  n.
Lemma 3. Let M be the ideal extension of GΦ(W,B).
M 
= ∅ ⇔ ∃S: cons(S)∧
(
Φ(Yn, Zn)≡
∧
z∈S
z
)
Proof. It is shown in Dunne and Bench-Capon [19], that every T ∈ Epr(GΦ) for which Φ ∈ T can be mapped to a satisfying
assignment 〈αT , βT 〉 of Φ(Yn, Zn); similarly every satisfying assignment 〈α,β〉 of Φ(Yn, Zn) gives rise to a preferred exten-
sion T〈α,β〉 containing Φ . If T ∈ Epr(GΦ) with Φ ∈ T then αT is given by yi :=  if and only if yi ∈ T ; similarly, for βT ,
zi :=  if and only if zi ∈ T . In the opposite direction if 〈α,β〉 satisﬁes Φ(Yn, Zn) then T〈α,β〉 ∈ Epr(GΦ) with T〈α,β〉 given
by
{Φ} ∪ {yi: αi = } ∪ {¬yi: αi = ⊥} ∪ {zi: βi = } ∪ {¬zi: βi = ⊥}
To begin suppose that S ⊂ {z1, . . . , zn,¬z1, . . . ,¬zn} is consistent and that Φ(Yn, Zn)≡∧z∈S z. Without loss of generality
it may be assumed that S = {z1, . . . , zk}. Consider GΦ in such a case. Given the correspondence between sets in Epr(GΦ)
containing Φ and satisfying assignments of Φ(Yn, Zn) we see the following:
a. sapr(GΦ,Φ).
This follows from Fact 2(a): Φ(Yn, Zn) is a positive instance of qsatΠ2 since the assignment zi =  (1 i  k) satisﬁes
Φ(Yn, Zn)≡∧ki=1 zi for all assignments to Yn .
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This is immediate from the premise Φ(Yn, Zn) ≡∧ki=1 zi so that no satisfying assignment of Φ can have zi = ⊥ when
1 i  k.
c. caadm(GΦ, z j) and caadm(GΦ,¬z j) (k+ 1 j  n).
Again, this is immediate from the assumption Φ(Yn, Zn) ≡∧ki=1 zi since zi :=  (1 i  k) satisﬁes Φ irrespective of
whichever assignment is made to Zn \ S .
Now consider the subset R = {Φ, z1, . . . , zk} of W : this is admissible since Φ attacks b1 the only attacker of zi ; in addition
from the premise Φ(Yn, Zn)≡∧ki=1 zi every clause C (which form the only attackers of Φ) must be attacked by at least one
argument in {z1, . . . , zk}. It is also the case, however, that no argument in R− can be credulously accepted: R− contains only
clause arguments, C , which are self-attacking; and the arguments ¬zi for 1 i  k. From (b) none of these are credulously
accepted. It follows that R is an admissible set none of whose attackers is credulously accepted. From Lemma 1 it follows
that R is an ideal set and thus M 
= ∅. In fact, it is not hard to see that M = R: if R were not maximal there would have
to be at least one sceptically accepted argument not included in R: no argument in {y1, . . . , yn,¬y1, . . . ,¬yn} is sceptically
accepted since each is credulously accepted. Neither the clause arguments nor those in {b1,b2,b3} can be sceptically ac-
cepted (since Φ ∈ M). Finally that those arguments in {z1, . . . , zn,¬z1, . . . ,¬zn} \ R cannot be sceptically accepted follows
from (b) and (c). In summary, if S is consistent with Φ(Yn, Zn)≡∧z∈S z then M 
= ∅.
For the converse implication suppose that M 
= ∅. In this case we must have Φ ∈ M and for some conﬂict-free subset,
T of {z1, . . . , zn,¬z1, . . . ,¬zn}, T ⊂ M. Without loss of generality suppose that M \ {Φ} = {z1, . . . , zk}. We claim that
Φ(Yn, Zn) ≡∧ki=1 zi . To see this ﬁrst observe that ¬caadm(GΦ,¬z j) for 1 j  k: otherwise, from Lemma 1, we could not
have z j ∈M. Thus, using the correspondence between preferred extensions of GΦ containing Φ and satisfying assignments
of Φ(Yn, Zn), any assignment in which z j = ⊥ for 1 j  k cannot satisfy Φ(Yn, Zn). Similarly, when z j =  for each 1
j  k, then every assignment to Yn combined with every assignment to 〈zk+1, . . . , zn〉 will satisfy Φ(Yn, Zn), i.e. Φ(Yn, Zn)≡∧k
i=1 zi . 
Theorem 2. cs is Σ p2 -complete.
Proof. For membership in Σ p2 , H(X ,A) is a cohesive system if and only if
veradm
(
H(X ,A),
⋂
S∈Epr
S
)
which can be tested by checking
∃S veridl(H, S)∧
∧
x∈X\S
¬sapr(H, x) (2)
That is, there is a subset (S) of X which deﬁnes an ideal set of H and for which no argument outside S is in every preferred
extension.12 From Theorem 1, veridl is in conp; in addition since sapr ∈ Π p2 its complement ¬sapr is in Σ p2 hence (2) gives
a Σ p2 test for cs.
13
For the lower bound we show that the complementary problem is Π p2 -hard using a reduction from qsat
Π
2 . We recall
that instances of qsatΠ2 comprise a cnf formula Φ(Yn, Zn) over disjoint sets of propositional variables such being accepted
if and only if for every assignment α of Xn there is some assignment, β , of Yn that satisﬁes Φ , i.e. ∀α∃β Φ(α,β).
Given an instance Ψ (Yn, Zn) of qsatΠ2 notice that we may introduce a new literal yn+1 to every clause to give a cnf,
Φ(Yn+1, Zn): it is easy to see that Φ is accepted as an instance of qsatΠ2 if and only if Ψ is also so accepted. Consider
the af GΦ , as described in Fig. 3. Since Φ(Yn+1, Zn) ≡ yn+1 ∨ Ψ (Yn, Zn) as a consequence of Lemma 3 it follows that GΦ
has an empty ideal extension. In addition sapr(GΦ,Φ) holds if and only if for every assignment α of Yn+1 there is some
assignment, β , of Zn , for which Φ(α,β) = . Thus GΦ fails to be cohesive if and only if Φ(Yn+1, Zn) is accepted as an
instance of qsatΠ2 . It follows that deciding if a framework is not cohesive is Π
p
2 -hard and thus cs is Σ
p
2 -complete. 
Corollary 1. The property of coherence is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for an af to be cohesive.
12 Notice that any such S would form the ideal extension of H.
13 Note that we could extrapolate the existence part of the ∃∀ structure implicit in ¬sa(H, x) by “guessing” a set Ux to associate with each x /∈ S in the
scope of the opening existential quantiﬁer. With this approach, the test ¬sapr(H, x) is replaced by verifying that Ux is a preferred extension of H (conp)
and that x /∈ Ux .
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2: repeat
3: i := i + 1
4: Ui := {y ∈Wi−1: ∃z ∈Z: 〈z, y〉 ∈Ai−1 and {z}− ∩Wi−1 = ∅}
5: Wi :=Wi−1 \Ui
6: Ai :=Ai−1 \ {〈y, z〉: y ∈Ui}
7: until Wi =Wi−1
8: return Wi
Algorithm 1. Credulous acceptance in bipartite frameworks.
Proof. The af GΦ used in the proof of Theorem 2 is coherent if and only the argument Φ is sceptically accepted.14 Recalling
that GΦ has an empty ideal extension, regardless of whether Φ is accepted as an instance of qsatΠ2 , it follows that GΦ is
coherent if and only if it is not cohesive. 
3.4. Frameworks with eﬃcient algorithms
We recall that bipartite afs, 〈X ,A〉 are those for which X may be partitioned into two sets – Y and Z – both of which
are conﬂict-free in 〈X ,A〉. We use the notation B(Y,Z,A) for such frameworks. One advantage of bipartite frameworks, as
demonstrated in Dunne [16], is that the canonical decision problems associated with the extension semantics introduced in
Dung [12], i.e. preferred and stable, admit polynomial time algorithms with bipartite frameworks. We now show that such
eﬃcient algorithms also exist for ideal semantics. Since, the method also features in the algorithm for constructing the ideal
extension in general frameworks, we ﬁrst brieﬂy outline the polynomial time procedure for caadm(〈Y,Z,A〉, x).
The idea underlying this is as follows: suppose, without loss of generality, that x ∈ Y . The algorithm identiﬁes the
maximal subset, SY of Y for which veradm holds.15 Starting from a set, W (initially W = Y), the algorithm removes
those arguments, U , from W that cannot be credulously accepted: U consists of arguments in W that are attacked by
an unattacked argument in Z . Having ﬁltered indefensible arguments from W , i.e. replaced W by W \ U , any attack
(on arguments in Z) originating from U can be removed from A. Removing such attacks, however, may lead to further
arguments in W becoming indefensible, thus the process repeats until no further arguments need to be removed. The ﬁnal
set of arguments in W will be SY : the maximal subset of Y for which veradm holds. For completeness the method is
presented in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3. If B(Y,Z,A) is a bipartite af then B(Y,Z,A) is cohesive.
Proof. Consider any bipartite af, B(Y,Z,A), and let
M=
⋂
S⊆Y∪Z: S∈Epr(B)
S
Thus M is the set of sceptically accepted arguments of B. We can deﬁne a partition of each of the sets Y and Z into three
subsets as follows:
Ysa = Y ∩M; Zsa =Z ∩M
Yca =
{
y ∈ Y: caadm(B, y)
} \M; Zca = {z ∈Z: caadm(B, z)} \M
Yout =
{
y ∈ Y: ¬caadm(B, y)
}; Zout = {z ∈ Z: ¬caadm(B, z)}
Notice that since every argument in M is sceptically accepted and from the fact that B is coherent16 – so that every
preferred extension of B is also a stable extension – we must have
Y−sa ∪Y+sa ⊆Zout; Z−sa ∪Z+sa ⊆ Yout
In addition,
∀y ∈ Yca {y}− ∩Zca 
= ∅; ∀z ∈Zca {z}− ∩Yca 
= ∅
To see this, suppose without loss of generality, that for some y ∈ Yca we have {y}− ∩Zca = ∅: since {y}− ∩Zsa = ∅ (from
the deﬁnition of Zsa) this would imply that {y}− ⊆ Zout , i.e. no attacker of y is credulously accepted. Now, since B is
coherent, such a situation would mean that y was sceptically accepted, thereby contradicting the maximality of Ysa .
14 Note that, as a consequence, deciding coherence is Π p2 -complete.
15 This subset is not, necessarily, a preferred extension since there may be arguments from Z which could be added to SY .
16 The framework B is bipartite and so does not contain any odd-length directed cycle. That this suﬃces to guarantee coherence was noted in Dunne and
Bench-Capon [19].
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are preferred extensions of B: the set Ysa ∪ Yca is the maximal subset of Y which is admissible, however, any preferred
extension containing Ysa ∪ Yca must have Zsa as a subset, i.e. there is a preferred extension, PY , of which M ∪ Yca is a
subset. The set M∪Yca cannot be a strict subset of PY otherwise we would have PY ∩Zca 
= ∅ and PY is not conﬂict-free,
or PY ∩ (Yout ∪Zout) 
= ∅ contradicting the property that no argument in Yout ∪Zout is credulously accepted. In summary,
we have identiﬁed two preferred extensions M ∪ Yca and M ∪ Zca of B. That M is admissible will follow from the fact
that both Ysa and Zsa are admissible. Suppose Ysa is not admissible: this could only happen if there were an argument
z ∈ Zout which attacked Ysa and for which z /∈ Y+sa . In this case, however, the same attack would be undefended in the
set M ∪ Zca contradicting the fact this latter set is a preferred extension. By an identical argument we see that Zsa is
admissible and now, by a similar argument to that of Lemma 1 it follows that M= Ysa ∪Zsa is admissible. 
Corollary 2. Let B(Y,Z,A) be a bipartite af. The ideal extension of B(Y,Z,A) may be constructed in polynomial time.
Proof. From Theorem 3 the ideal extension of B corresponds with the set of all sceptically accepted arguments of B. Using
Algorithm 1 we can identify this set in polynomial time: in bipartite frameworks an argument is sceptically accepted if and
only if each of its attackers is not credulously accepted.17 
We note that as a consequence of Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 in the case of bipartite afs, the decision problems veridl ,
ver∅ie , verie and caidl are all in p and cs is trivial.
3.5. Finding the ideal extension
The analysis of properties of the ideal extension in bipartite frameworks and the polynomial time method for construct-
ing this suggest an approach to constructing the ideal extension in arbitrary afs. In this section we show that if the set of
credulously accepted arguments within X has already been identiﬁed then this suﬃces eﬃciently to build the ideal exten-
sion. An immediate corollary is that decision questions concerning the ideal extension are in the class pnp‖ . In Section 3.6
we present evidence that this upper bound is optimal. We note that the ﬁxpoint deﬁnition of grounded extension allows
this to be constructed eﬃciently, i.e. fgr ∈ p.18
We observe that typical problems shown to be fpnp‖ -complete include optimisation problems where the range of output
values can be suitably restricted, e.g. the minimum number of colours required properly to vertex colour a graph, the
number of edges in the longest (simple) path, etc. We refer the reader to Buhrman et al. [5] for a fuller discussion.
Theorem 4. ﬁe is fpnp‖ -complete.
Proof. We ﬁrst present the argument that ﬁe is fpnp‖ -hard.
The following function problem is easily seen to be complete for fpnp‖ .
Sat Collection sc
Instance: Ξ = 〈ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . , ϕr〉 a collection of 3-cnf formulae.
Problem: Compute the r-bit value χ(Ξ)= c1c2c3 · · · cr ∈ [0,2r − 1] in which c j = 1 if and only if ϕ j is satisﬁable.
Given an instance, Ξ = 〈ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . , ϕr〉 of sc form the af consisting of the r instantiations of Fϕi as described in The-
orem 1(a). Letting M denote the set of arguments forming the ideal extension of this framework, from Theorem 1(d),
it follows that M ⊆ {Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . ,Ψr} (where Ψi is the argument added to Hϕi ). In addition, Ψi /∈ M if and only if ϕi is
satisﬁable. It follows that χ(Ξ) can be computed directly given M, and thus ﬁe is fpnp‖ -hard.
To see that ﬁe ∈ fpnp‖ let H(X ,A) be an af and consider the following partition of X (similar to that described in the
proof of Theorem 3),
Xout =
{
x ∈X : ¬caadm(H, x)
}
Xpsa =
{
x ∈X : {x}− ∪ {x}+ ⊆Xout
} \Xout
Xca =
{
x ∈X : caadm(H, x)
} \Xpsa
This partition satisﬁes X−psa ⊆Xout and X+psa ⊆Xout . In addition,
∀y ∈Xca∃z ∈Xca
(〈y, z〉 ∈A or 〈z, y〉 ∈A)
17 More generally, the property that sa(H, x) if and only if ∀y ∈ {x}− ¬ca(H, y) holds whenever H is coherent.
18 In contrast it is not diﬃcult to show that computing the set of all sceptically accepted arguments is complete for the function class fp
Σ
p
2‖ .
P.E. Dunne / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 1559–1591 15711: function ﬁnd-af-ideal-extension (H= 〈X ,A〉)
2: Xout := {x ∈X : ¬caadm(H, x)};
3: Xpsa := {x ∈X : {x}+ ∪ {x}− ⊆Xout} \Xout;
4: Xca := {x ∈X : caadm(H, x)} \Xpsa;
5: Form the bipartite af B(Xpsa,Xout,F) where
F =A \ {〈y, z〉: y ∈Xca ∪Xout and z ∈Xca ∪Xout}
6: Construct M: the maximal admissible subset of Xpsa in B(Xpsa,Xout,F) using Algorithm 1
7: return M;
Algorithm 2. Construction of the ideal extension in afs.
for were this not the case for some x ∈ Xca then x would be in Xpsa as all of its attackers and attacked arguments would
belong to Xout .19
With the partition of X just deﬁned we may construct a bipartite framework – B(Xpsa,Xout,F) – in which the set of
attacks, F , is
F =def A \
{〈y, z〉: y ∈Xca ∪Xout and z ∈Xca ∪Xout}
(Note that B(Xpsa,Xout,F) is bipartite since Xpsa is conﬂict-free and F contains no attacks involving two arguments from
Xout .)
The fpnp‖ upper bound now follows from Algorithm 2. We observe that: the partition 〈Xpsa,Xca,Xout〉 can be constructed
using |X | calls (made in parallel, i.e. non-adaptively) to an np oracle that decides ca(H, x) (one for each x ∈X ); given this
partition the bipartite graph B(Xpsa,Xout,F) can be constructed by a (deterministic) polynomial time algorithm; from the
characterisation proved in Lemma 1 the ideal extension of H is the maximal admissible subset of Xpsa in the bipartite
graph B(Xpsa,Xout,F) and this set can be identiﬁed in polynomial time using Algorithm 1. Thus ﬁe ∈ fpnp‖ . 
We notice that the upper bound proved in Theorem 4 coupled with the af GΦ has a, perhaps, rather surprising conse-
quence. Deﬁne the decision problem subset-term-equivalence (ste) as follows:
Instance: Propositional formula, ϕ(Yn, Zn), over the logical basis {∧,∨,¬}.
Question: Is there a subset, S , of the literals over Zn such that either ϕ(Yn, Zn)≡∧z∈S z or ϕ(Zn)≡∨z∈S z.
It is easy to see the ste ∈ Σ p2 . We can, however, improve this upper bound.20
Theorem 5. ste ∈ pnp‖ .
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 3 using the general translation of {∧,∨,¬}-formulae from Dunne and Bench-Capon [19]: a
witnessing subset of the literals is given by M \ {ϕ} in the af, Gϕ . 
The technique employed to established fpnp‖ -hardness in proving Theorem 4 can be used to demonstrate pnp‖ -hardness
for a number of (admittedly rather artiﬁcial) decision problems concerning properties of the ideal extension. For example,
Corollary 3. Let parity-ie be the decision problem which given an af, H, returns true if and only if the ideal extension of H contains
an odd number of arguments. The problem parity-ie is pnp‖ -complete.
Proof. Membership is immediate from the construction of Theorem 4. Hardness follows from the result of Wagner [36,
Corollary 12.4, p. 274] that determining the parity of the number of satisﬁable formulae in a collection 〈Φ1, . . . ,Φm〉 of
given cnfs is pnp‖ -hard and the reduction from sc of Theorem 4. 
More generally, for any predicate over collections of cnf formulae related to the cardinality of the set of satisﬁable
formulae and which is pnp‖ -hard, the corresponding predicate with respect to the ideal extension of a given af can also be
proven pnp‖ -hard using the approach of Corollary 3.
Corollary 4.H(X ,A) is cohesive if every argument x ∈X is credulously accepted.
19 In coherent systems Xpsa is exactly the set of all sceptically accepted arguments, Xsa . In general, however, Xsa will be a subset of Xpsa .
20 In fact a rather more general result is possible. Let Term Equivalence (te) be the problem of deciding given ϕ(Zn) if is there a subset of literals S over Zn
for which ϕ(Zn) ≡∧y∈S y or ϕ(Zn) ≡∨y∈S y, i.e. where the instance formula is not required to an instance of qsatΠ2 . The problem te is in pnp‖ and the
related function problem can be solved in fpnp‖ . A full proof is beyond the scope of the current paper and we refer the reader to Dunne [18] for the detailed
argument.
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Relative complexity of testing acceptability.
Decision problem Lower bound Upper bound
capr np-hard np
caidl conp-hard pnp‖
sapr Π
p
2 -hard Π
p
2
Proof. If ∀x ∈ X caadm(H, x) then Xout = ∅. In such cases, the only arguments, x, that could belong to Xpsa are those for
which {x}+ ∪ {x}− = ∅, i.e. arguments which are “isolated” in H(X ,A). Such arguments are sceptically accepted and form
an admissible subset of X . Furthermore no argument in X \Xpsa can be sceptically accepted (since each of these attacks or
is attacked by has at least one credulously accepted argument). It follows that Xpsa = {x: sapr(H, x)} and Xpsa is the ideal
extension, i.e. H is cohesive. 
Combining the results and noting the equivalence capr ≡ caadm we obtain the picture of the relative complexities in
Table 4.
In total these classiﬁcations reinforce the case that caadm is easier than caidl which, in turn, is easier than sapr .
3.6. Reducing the complexity gaps
In [6], Chang and Kadin introduce the concepts of a language having the properties op2 and opω where op is one of the
Boolean operators {and, or}. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2. (See [6, pp. 175–176].) Let L be a language, i.e. a set of ﬁnite words over an alphabet. The languages, andk(L)
and ork(L) (k 1) are
andk(L) =def
{〈w1,w2, . . . ,wk〉: ∀1 i  k wi ∈ L}
ork(L) =def
{〈w1,w2, . . . ,wk〉: ∃1 i  k wi ∈ L}
The languages andω(L) and orω(L) are,
andω(L) =def
⋃
k1
andk(L); orω(L) =def
⋃
k1
ork(L)
For op one the operations from {and,or}, the language, L, is said to have property opk (resp. opω) if opk(L) pm L (resp.
opω(L) pm L).
The reason why these language operations are of interest is the following result.
Fact 3. (See [6, Theorem 9, p. 182].) A language L is pnp‖ -complete (via 
p
m reducibility) if and only if all of the following hold.
F1. L ∈ pnp‖ .
F2. L is np-hard and L is conp-hard.
F3. L has property and2 .
F4. L has property orω .
As a consequence of Fact 3, we have,
Theorem 6.
a. If caidl is np-hard then caidl is pnp‖ -complete.
b. If caidl ∈ conp then verie is dp-complete.
c. If caidl ∈ conp then ver∅ie is np-complete.
d. If verie has property orω then verie is pnp‖ -complete.
Proof. a. With the assumption that caidl is np-hard, caidl would satisfy conditions (F1) and (F2) of Fact 3. To complete
the argument it suﬃces to show that caidl already has property and2 and property orω . For the ﬁrst of these consider
any instance 〈〈H1, x〉, 〈H2, y〉〉 of and2(caidl). Form the af, H, consisting of copies of H1 and H2 together with three
additional arguments {zx, zy, z}. Now adding the attacks {〈x, zx〉, 〈y, zy〉, 〈zx, z〉, 〈zy, z〉}, via Lemma 2, 〈H, z〉 is accepted as
an instance of caidl if and only if caidl(〈H1, x〉) ∧ caidl(〈H2, y〉). To see that caidl has property orω consider an instance
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{y, z}. The instance is completed by adding the attacks {〈xi, y〉: 1 i m} and the attack 〈y, z〉. Again, via Lemma 2, 〈H, z〉
is accepted as an instance of caidl if and only if
∨m
i=1 caidl(〈Hi, xi〉).
b. It has already been shown that verie is dp-hard. Consider the languages,
L1 =def
{〈H, S〉: ∀x ∈ S, caidl(H, x)}
L2 =def
{〈H, S〉: ∀x /∈ S, ¬caidl(H, x)}
We have L1 ∈ conp (by the assumption caidl is in conp and by the straightforward generalisation of (a) that shows caidl has
property andω). In addition, L2 ∈ np (from the premise caidl ∈ conp and the fact that ¬caidl has property andω since caidl
has property orω). With these choices of L1 and L2, 〈H, S〉 is accepted as an instance verie if and only if 〈H, S〉 ∈ L1 ∩ L2
so that verie ∈ dp .
c. Easy consequence of (b).
d. It has already been shown that verie satisﬁes (F1) and (F2) of Fact 3. In addition, verie has property andω (thus, triv-
ially, also and2): given an instance 〈〈H1, S1〉, 〈H2, S2〉, . . . , 〈Hm, Sm〉〉 of andω(verie) ﬁx H to consist of the m frameworks
〈H1,H2, . . . ,Hm〉 and S as ⋃mi=1 Si . With these, 〈H, S〉 is accepted as an instance of verie if and only if ∧mi=1 verie(Hi, Si).
It follows that were verie to have property orω , then verie would be pnp‖ -complete via Fact 3. 
We may interpret Theorem 6 as focusing the issue of obtaining exact classiﬁcations in terms of caidl . If caidl ∈ conp
(so that, with the usual assumption of np 
= conp, caidl would not be np-hard) then we obtain exact classiﬁcations of the
complexity of {caidl,verie,ver∅ie} as {conp,dp,np}-complete. On the other hand, an alternative hypothesis, in the event of
caidl /∈ conp, is that suggested by Theorem 6(a): that caidl is pnp‖ -complete, a result which would follow by demonstrating
caidl to be np-hard.
In fact, there is strong evidence that caidl /∈ conp and, using one suite of techniques is more likely to be complete within
pnp‖ . Our formal justiﬁcation of these claims rests on a number of technical analyses using results of Chang et al. [7], which
in turn develop ideas of [1,3,34].21 Two key concepts in our further analyses of caidl are,
a. The so-called Unique Satisﬁability problem (usat).
b. Randomised reductions between languages.
Unique Satisﬁability (usat)
Instance: cnf formula Φ(Xn) with propositional variables 〈x1, . . . , xn〉.
Question: Does Φ(Xn) have exactly one satisfying assignment?
Determining the exact complexity of usat remains an open problem. It is known that usat ∈ dp and while Blass and
Gurevich [3] show it to be conp-hard,22 usat has only be shown to be complete for dp using a randomised reduction
technique of Valiant and Vazirani [34]. Such reductions are studied in Chang et al. [7] speciﬁcally with respect to usat via
the following general deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3. Let L1 and L2 be languages and δ ∈ [0,1]. We say that L1 randomly reduces to L2 (denoted L1 rpm L2) with
probability δ if there is a polynomial time computable function, f , and polynomial bound q with f mapping pairs 〈x, z〉 – x
an instance of L1 and z an element of 〈0,1〉q(|x|) – to instances, y, of L2, such that for z drawn uniformly at random from
〈0,1〉q(|x|)
x ∈ L1 ⇒ Prob
[
f (x, z) ∈ L2
]
 δ
x /∈ L1 ⇒ Prob
[
f (x, z) /∈ L2
]= 1
The principal property distinguishing the randomised reduction relation, rpm , from the deterministic relation, pm , that we
have used previously is the following: in showing F pm G an instance of F produces exactly one instance of G . In proving,
F rpm G (with probability δ) an instance, x of F , produces a set of instances, f (x) of G . This set must satisfy two criteria: if
x is not accepted as an instance of F then every member of f (x) fails to be accepted as an instance of G; if, on the other
hand, x is accepted as an instance of F then at least δ × | f (x)| distinct elements of the set f (x) must be positive instances
of G . Notice that if F is hard with respect to some complexity class C such that C 
= p under standard assumptions, e.g.
C = np then F rpm G is seen as evidence G /∈ p.23
We have the following properties of usat and randomised reductions:
21 These ideas have previously featured in earlier AI related complexity studies of Eiter and Gottlob [22].
22 The reader should note that [27, p. 93] has a typographical slip whereby Blass and Gurevich’s result is described as proving usat to be np-hard.
23 Since a polynomial time algorithm for G would yield a randomised polynomial time (rp) algorithm for F : just as it is conjectured that p 
= np similarly it
is conjectured that p 
= rp 
= np.
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Fact 4.
a. satrpm usat with probability 1/(4n) [34, Lemma 2.1, p. 88].
b. If L1 rpm L2 with probability 1/p(n) for some polynomially bounded function, p, and L2 has property orω then L1 rpm L2 with
probability 1− 2−n [7, Fact 1, p. 361].24
A relationship between unique satisﬁability (usat) and caidl is established in the following theorem. Notice that the
reduction we describe is deterministic, i.e. not randomised.
Theorem 7. usatpm caidl .
Proof. Given an instance Φ(Zn) of usat construct an af, K(X ,A) as follows. First form the system FΦ described in The-
orem 1, but without the attack 〈Ψ,Φ〉 contained in this and with attacks 〈C j,C j〉 for each clause of Φ .25 We then add a
further n+ 1 arguments, {y1, . . . , yn, x} and attacks{〈zi, yi〉, 〈¬zi, yi〉: 1 i  n}∪ {〈yi, x〉: 1 i  n}
The instance of caidl is 〈K(X ,A), x〉 and the resulting af is illustrated in Fig. 4.
We now claim that Φ(Zn) has a unique satisfying assignment if and only if x is a member of MK the ideal extension
of K(X ,A).
Suppose ﬁrst that Φ(Zn) does not have a unique satisfying assignment. If Φ is unsatisﬁable – i.e. the number of satisfying
assignments is zero – then all of the arguments forming the sub-system, FΦ , fail to be credulously accepted, in particular,
24 The bound actually stated in [7] is for arbitrary exponentially decreasing functions, i.e. not just 2−n .
25 We make these arguments self-attacking purely for ease of presentation: the required effect – that no argument C j is ever credulously accepted – can
be achieved without self-attacks simply by adding two arguments d j and e j for each clause together with attacks {〈C j ,d j〉, 〈d j , e j〉, 〈e j ,C j〉}.
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yi is possible. There remains the possibility that Φ(Zn) has two or more satisfying assignments. Suppose α = 〈a1,a2, . . . ,an〉
and β = 〈b1,b2, . . . ,bn〉 are such that Φ(α)=Φ(β) =  and α 
= β . Without loss of generality, we may assume that a1 
= b1
(since α 
= β there must be at least one variable of Zn that is assigned differing values in each). In this case both z1 and ¬z1
are credulously accepted so that neither can belong to MK: from Lemma 2 condition (M1) gives z1 /∈ MK (since ¬z1 is
credulously accepted) and ¬z1 /∈MK (since z1 is credulously accepted). It now follows that x /∈KM via (M2) of Lemma 2:
neither attacker of y1, an argument which attacks x, belongs to MK . We deduce that if Φ(Zn) is not a positive instance of
usat then 〈K, x〉 is not a positive instance of caidl .
One the other hand suppose that α = 〈a1,a2, . . . ,an〉 deﬁnes the unique satisfying assignment of Φ(Zn). Consider the
following subset of X :
M=
⋃
i: ai=
{zi} ∪
⋃
i: ai=⊥
{¬zi} ∪ {Φ, x}
Certainly M is admissible: since α satisﬁes Φ(Zn) each C j and y is attacked by some z or ¬z in M and thus all of the
attacks on Φ and x are counterattacked. Similarly Φ defends arguments against the attacks by Ψ . It is also the case, however,
that no admissible set of K contains an attacker of M. No admissible set can contain C j (since these arguments are self-
attacking), Ψ (since the only defenders of the attack by Φ are C j arguments) or yk (1 k n) (since these require Ψ as a
defence against {zk,¬zk}). Furthermore for zi ∈ M an admissible set containing ¬zi would only be possible if there were
a satisfying assignment of Φ under which ¬zi = : this would contradict the assumption the Φ had exactly one satisfying
assignment.
We deduce that Φ(Zn) has a unique satisfying assignment if and only if x is in the ideal extension of K(X ,A). 
Combining Theorems 6 and 7 with Facts 3 and 4 gives the following.
Corollary 5.
a. usatpm ¬ver∅ie .
b. caidl is complete for pnp‖ under 
rp
m with probability 1− 2−n.
c. ver∅ie is complete for pnp‖ via 
rp
m with probability 1− 2−n.
d. verie is complete for pnp‖ via 
rp
m with probability 1− 2−n.
Proof. Part (a) follows from the fact that the af KΦ of Theorem 7 has a non-empty ideal extension, MK , if and only if
x ∈MK .
To see that (b) holds consider the decision problem orω(sat-unsat) which is pnp‖ -complete under (standard, determinis-
tic) pm reductions. We thus obtain
orω(sat-unsat)rpm sat-unsatwith probability 1/n
(as observed in [7, Lemma 1, p. 365], simply choose, uniformly at random, one of the n sub-problems 〈Φi,Ψi〉 in the instance
〈〈Φ1,Ψ1〉, . . . , 〈Φn,Ψn〉〉 of orω(sat-unsat)).
Now, via [34], sat-unsatrpm usat with probability 1/(4n) so that, combining these randomised reductions,
orω(sat-unsat)rpm usatwith probability 1/
(
4n2
)
Now applying the (deterministic) reduction of Theorem 7 shows
orω(sat-unsat)rpm caidl with probability 1/
(
4n2
)
As demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 6(a), caidl has property orω so that via Fact 4(b) we obtain,
orω(sat-unsat)rpm caidl with probability 1− 2−n
Since we know that caidl ∈ pnp‖ this completes the proof.
For (c) we may apply a similar argument to that of part (b) to obtain orω(sat-unsat)rpm ¬ver∅ie with probability 1/(4n2).
Since ver∅ie has property andω so its complement, has property orω . Part (c) now follows via Fact 4(b) and the fact that pnp‖
is closed under complementation.
Part (d) is an easy consequence of (c) since ver∅ie is a special case of verie . 
To conclude we observe that although usat pm caidl it is unlikely to be the case that these decision problems have
equivalent complexity, i.e. that caidl pm usat.
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Complexity of ideal semantics relative to randomised reductions.
Decision problem Complexity rpm probability
caadm np-complete 1
caidl pnp‖ -complete 1− 2−n
sapr Π
p
2 -complete 1
veradm p –
veridl conp-complete 1
verpr conp-complete 1
ver∅pr conp-complete 1
verie pnp‖ -complete 1− 2−n
ver∅ie pnp‖ -complete 1− 2−n
Corollary 6. If caidl pm usat (note deterministic reduction) then the Polynomial Hierarchy (ph) collapses to Σ p3 , i.e.
caidl pm usat ⇒
⋃
k3
Σ
p
k ∪
⋃
k3
Π
p
k ⊆Σ p3
Proof. Suppose it is the case that caidl pm usat. We then have
orω(usat) pm orω(caidl) by Theorem 7
pm caidl since caidl has property orω
pm usat by premise
So that usat would have property orω: [7, Theorem 5, p. 364] demonstrates that this leads to the collapse stated. 
Now, noting that pm can be interpreted as “rpm with probability 1”, we can reconsider the lower bounds of Table 4
using hardness via rpm (with “high” probability) instead of hardness via pm , as shown in Table 5.
4. Ideal semantics in assumption-based frameworks
The formalism of abstract assumption-based argumentation frameworks (abfs) is described in Bondarenko et al. [4]
and offers an alternative but related approach to the af mechanisms of Dung [12]. Whereas the concept of argument and
attack within afs does not attempt to analyse issues of argument structure or the rationale underpinning attacks between
arguments, abfs view arguments as a statement justiﬁed through some formal logical deductive system with the concept of
attack being that the conclusion of one argument is incompatible with the premises supporting another. We now consider
similar complexity issues to those examined in the preceding sections for afs, concentrating on the model of abfs. Although
there is some variation in the exact speciﬁcation of decision problems, as before, the canonical questions of interest concern
Veriﬁcation and Credulous Acceptance.
We ﬁrst review the basic elements of abfs in Section 4.1 including the formal description of the veriﬁcation and credulous
reasoning problems. Following, in Section 4.2 we describe the translations, from Bondarenko et al. [4] of divers non-classical
logics into corresponding abf contexts and summarise the contribution of Dimopoulos, Nebel and Toni [8–10] in which
the computational complexity of credulous and sceptical reasoning under preferred, stable and admissible semantics was
considered.
Finally in Section 4.3 we consider the computational complexity of ideal semantics in abfs using a number of the settings
described in Section 4.2.
4.1. Review of elements from assumption-based argumentation frameworks
In the sequel 〈L, R〉 is a deductive system, i.e. L is a formal language whose elements are denumerable – e.g. well-formed
propositional formulae – and R is a set of inference rules, which we consider to be of the form
α1,α2, . . . ,αn
β
with αi ∈ L, β ∈ L and n  0. We refer to any T ⊆ L as a theory. Given T ⊆ L in the system 〈L, R〉 the subset Th(T ) of L of
derivable sentences for T in 〈L, R〉 has α ∈ Th(T ) if there is a (ﬁnite) sequence β1, . . . , βm (m > 0) with which for every i
(1  i m) either βi ∈ T or there is a rule26 βi ← α1,α2, . . . ,αn ∈ R and {α1, . . . ,αn} ⊆ {β1, . . . , βi−1}. We write T  α if
α ∈ Th(T ). Such systems are monotonic, i.e. if T  α then T ′  α for any T ′ ⊇ T .
26 For ease of readability we use the form β ← α1, . . . ,αn inside text.
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the novel concepts of assumptions and contrary provides an (argumentation founded) approach giving a uniﬁed treatment of
a wide variety of non-classical logics.
Deﬁnition 4. For a deductive system 〈L, R〉 an assumption-based framework w.r.t. 〈L, R〉 is a triple 〈T , A, –〉 where T ⊆ L is
a theory, A ⊆ L a non-empty set of assumptions, and – : A → L a mapping that associates with each assumption α ∈ A its
contrary, denoted α.
Although the contrary mapping can be instantiated as classical negation, it is not limited to this sense only. Instead of
the atomic notion of argument from Dung [12], the objects of interest within abfs are subsets of assumptions that deﬁne
extensions of the theory T according to various semantics. In this way, the following mirrors Deﬁnition 1 for afs, presenting
analogous ideas in abfs.
Deﬁnition 5. Let 〈T , A, –〉 be an abf w.r.t. some deductive system 〈L, R〉 and Δ ⊆ A. For ϕ ∈ L, we write Δ | ϕ as a
shorthand for ϕ ∈ Th(T ∪Δ).
The set of assumptions Δ attacks an assumption α ∈ A if Δ | α; Δ attacks a set of assumptions Δ′ if Δ | α for some
α ∈ Δ′ . We write att(Δ,α) to denote the attack relation over 2A × A, and similarly (albeit with a slight abuse of notation)
use att(Δ,Δ′) for attacks by Δ on a set of assumptions Δ′ . The assumption set Δ is said to be closed if Δ= {α ∈ A: Δ | α},
i.e. a closed assumption set cannot derive any assumption other than those already contained in it. Those frameworks whose
supporting deductive systems are such that every set of assumptions is closed are called ﬂat frameworks.
A set Δ⊆ A is conﬂict-free if ¬att(Δ,Δ); Δ is an admissible set of assumptions if it is closed, conﬂict-free, and for every
closed assumption set Δ′ if att(Δ′,Δ) then att(Δ,Δ′); Δ is a preferred extension if it is a maximal admissible set. A set Δ
is a stable extension if it is closed, conﬂict-free, and for every α ∈ A \Δ, att(Δ,α), i.e. Δ | α.
Following Dung et al. [14,15], Δ is an ideal set if Δ is admissible and a subset of every preferred extension; Δ is the
ideal extension if it is the maximal such set.27
Corresponding to the decision problems for afs considered earlier, we have the following formulations in abfs. Note that
the underlying deductive system 〈L, R〉 is reﬂected in the problem name rather than explicitly as part of the instance. We
use Es(〈T , A,– 〉) to denote the subsets of assumptions satisfying the criteria of semantics s in the abf 〈T , A,– 〉.
The formulations of ca〈L,R〉s and sa
〈L,R〉
s are rather more general than might seem to be the natural analogue: rather than
asking whether a given assumption, α belongs to at least one (or every) set in Es (so directly parallelling the form of cas
and sas from afs), the decision problems ask whether a given sentence, ϕ ∈ L, can be deduced via at least one (resp. every)
set in Es . In complexity terms for ﬂat frameworks and ϕ = α ∈ A, the given form is equivalent to the natural analogue:
Δ | ϕ = α if and only if α ∈ Δ.
4.2. Instantiations of abfs modelling default reasoning and their complexity
In this section we reprise the translations from a range of reasoning formalisms into equivalent abfs. Our presentation
summarises the descriptions from [4,10].
4.2.1. Logic programming – lp
We recall that a (normal) logic program, T , comprises a set of clauses of the form α ← β1, . . . , βm where α is a ground
atom from some underlying Herbrand base (HB) and βi is a literal from Lits=HB∪HBnot where HBnot = {notα: α ∈HB}.
Given a normal logic program, T , the corresponding abf is 〈T ,HBnot,– 〉 where for each assumption notα ∈ HBnot its
contrary not α = α. The underlying deductive system 〈L, R〉 corresponds to Horn logic derivability, where following [24],
assumptions notα are regarded as new atoms α∗ .
4.2.2. Default logic – dl
Given a deductive system for classical ﬁrst-order logic, 〈L0, R0〉 Reiter [33] deﬁnes a default theory as a pair 〈W , D〉
wherein W ⊆ L0 and D is a set of default rules
α : Mβ1, . . . ,Mβn
γ
where α,β1, . . . , βn, γ ∈ L0, n 0
Informally a default rule may be interpreted as “it is reasonable to assume γ if we know (or have proved that) α is the
case and have no basis on which to suppose any ¬βi (1 i  n) holds”, e.g. in the standard example of default reasoning
“it is reasonable to assume that Tweety can ﬂy if we know that Tweety is a bird and have no basis to suppose either that
Tweety is a penguin or that Tweety cannot ﬂy.” is expressed via the default rule
27 We recall that Dung et al. [14,15] have shown that every af, abf has a uniquely deﬁned ideal extension.
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Decision problems in abfs.
Problem name Instance Question
Veriﬁcation (ver〈L,R〉s ) 〈T , A,– 〉; Δ⊆ A Is Δ ∈ Es(〈T , A,– 〉)?
Credulous Acceptance (ca〈L,R〉s ) 〈T , A,– 〉; ϕ ∈ L ∃Δ ∈ Es(〈T , A,– 〉) for which Δ | ϕ?
Sceptical Acceptance (sa〈L,R〉s ) 〈T , A,– 〉; ϕ ∈ L ∀Δ ∈ Es (〈T , A,– 〉) does Δ | ϕ?
Existence (exists〈L,R〉s ) 〈T , A,– 〉 Is Es(〈T , A,– 〉) 
= ∅?
Emptiness (ver〈L,R〉,∅s ) 〈T , A,– 〉 Is Es(〈T , A,– 〉)= {∅}?
Table 7
Computational complexity of deciding Δ | ϕ .
Logic Complexity of deciding Δ | ϕ
lp p
dl conp-complete
ael conp-complete
bird(Tweety) : M¬penguin(Tweety),M ﬂies(Tweety)
ﬂies(Tweety)
For the default theory 〈W , D〉 the related abf 〈T , A,– 〉 is formulated in the deductive system 〈L, R〉 with
L = L0 ∪ {Mα: α ∈ L0}
R = R0 ∪ D
T = W
A = {Mβ: β ∈ L0 and Mβ occurs in some default rule of D}
Mα = ¬α
Given the abf 〈T , A,– 〉 representing the default theory (W , D), Bondarenko et al. [4, Theorem 3.16, p. 81] establish a link
between stable extensions of 〈T , A,– 〉 and Reiter’s concept of extension: for a deductive system 〈L0, R0〉, E ⊆ L0 is an
extension of the default theory (W , D) in the sense deﬁned by Reiter [33] if and only if there is a stable extension Δ of the
corresponding abf for which E = L0 ∩Δ.28
4.2.3. Autoepistemic logic – ael
In ael the starting point is a deductive system, 〈L, R〉, in which L is a modal language with modal operator B, and R
an inference scheme of classical logic for L: the interpretation of Bα being that “α is believed”. For a theory T ⊆ L of ael,
the corresponding abf, 〈T , A,– 〉 w.r.t. 〈L, R〉 has A = {Bα: α ∈ L} ∪ {¬Bα: α ∈ L}. The contrary mapping has Bα = ¬Bα and
¬Bα = α.
Both Reiter [33] and Konolige [28] have observed that default rules of the form γ ← α : Mβ1, . . . ,Mβn can be regarded
as ael inference rules of the form γ ← Bα,¬B¬β1, . . . ,¬B¬βn .
As with the connection between Reiter’s extensions of a default theory mentioned earlier, so too one may connect
the stable expansions of an autoepistemic theory with stable extensions of the corresponding abf. Moore [31] deﬁnes the
former via: E is a stable expansion of the autoepistemic theory, T , if and only if E = Th(T ∪ {Bα: α ∈ E} ∪ {¬Bα: α /∈ E}).
Bondarenko et al. [4, Theorem 3.18, p. 82] prove “E ⊆ A is a stable extension of the abf modelling an autoepistemic theory,
T , if and only if E is consistent and a stable expansion of T ”.
4.2.4. Summary of known complexity properties
A key contribution of Dimopoulos et al. [10] is in linking the computational complexity of the decision problems in
Table 6 to that of the derivability problem in the supporting deductive system 〈L, R〉, i.e. the computational complexity of
deciding given Δ ⊆ A and ϕ ∈ L whether Δ | ϕ . If (Δ | ϕ) is decidable in some class C then a number of generic upper
bounds can be demonstrated in terms of oracle computations provided with access to C oracles. Thus, from the complexity
bounds on deciding Δ | ϕ stated in Table 7 upper bounds of np (for lp theories); Σ p2 (for dl) holds for credulous acceptance
(w.r.t. preferred and stable extensions) in lp and dl; the upper bounds of Table 8 have been derived.
28 Reiter’s formal deﬁnition of “E is an extension of (W , D)” is in terms of E being a ﬁxpoint of a function Γ0 : 2L0 → 2L0 . Given S ⊆ L0, Γ0(S) is the
smallest set that contains W , is closed w.r.t. 〈L0, R0〉 and for each default rule γ ← α : Mβ1, . . . ,Mβn should α ∈ Γ0(S) and {¬β1, . . . ,¬βn} ∩ S = ∅ then
γ ∈ Γ0(S).
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Upper bounds for decision problems in abfs from [10].
Problem lp dl ael
ver〈L,R〉adm p pnp Π
p
2
ver〈L,R〉pr conp Π
p
2 Π
p
3
ver〈L,R〉st p pnp Π
p
2
ca〈L,R〉pr np Σ
p
2 Σ
p
3
ca〈L,R〉st np Σ
p
2 Σ
p
2
sa〈L,R〉pr Π
p
2 Π
p
3 Π
p
4
sa〈L,R〉st conp Π
p
2 Π
p
2
Although [10] does not address lower bounds for the veriﬁcation problems, all of the bounds for the credulous and
sceptical reasoning problems are shown to be tight, i.e. if C is an upper bound on ca〈L,R〉s or sa〈L,R〉s from Table 8 then the
decision question is also C-hard.
4.3. Complexity of ideal semantics in abfs
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 characterise properties of ideal sets and the ideal extension in afs. Under certain restrictions
both of these have counterparts for abfs.
Lemma 4. Let T = 〈T , A,– 〉 be an abf w.r.t. the deductive system 〈L, R〉. If T is a ﬂat framework then:
a. ∀Δ⊆ A, ver〈L,R〉idl (T ,Δ) if and only if
ver〈L,R〉adm (T ,Δ) and ∀Γ ⊆ A: att(Γ,Δ) ⇒ ¬ver〈L,R〉adm (T ,Γ )
b. Let Θ ⊆ A be the ideal extension of T . For all α ∈ A, α ∈ Θ if and only if
∀Γ ⊆ A: att(Γ,α) ⇒ [¬ ver〈L,R〉adm (T ,Γ ) and att(Θ,Γ )]
Proof. For (a), if Δ is an ideal set it is admissible by deﬁnition. Considering any Γ ⊆ A for which att(Γ,Δ), were Γ to
be admissible it would not be possible for Δ ⊆ Γ ′ for every preferred extension since a preferred extension containing Γ
would fail to be conﬂict-free. Thus, if Δ is an ideal set then no subset, Γ , attacking it can be admissible. On the other
hand let Δ be admissible and no Δ′ attacking it be so. Consider any preferred extension, Γ of T : from the fact that Γ is
a preferred extension we have ¬att(Γ,Γ ); from the premise that Δ is admissible it further holds ¬att(Δ,Δ). Consider the
set Γ ∪Δ.29 We claim that ¬att(Γ ∪Δ,Γ ∪Δ). Suppose this were not so, i.e. att(Γ ∪Δ,Γ ∪Δ). Then either att(Γ ∪Δ,Δ)
or att(Γ ∪Δ,Γ ). In the former case
att(Γ ∪Δ,Δ) ⇒ att(Δ,Γ ∪Δ) sinceΔ is admissible
⇒ att(Δ,Γ ) since ¬att(Δ,Δ)
⇒ att(Γ,Δ) since Γ is admissible
⇒ ¬ver〈L,R〉adm (T ,Γ ) from premise that no attacker ofΔ is admissible
This contradicts the choice of Γ as a preferred extension.
In the latter case,
att(Γ ∪Δ,Γ ) ⇒ att(Γ,Γ ∪Δ) since Γ is admissible
⇒ att(Γ,Δ) since ¬att(Γ,Γ )
⇒ ¬ver〈L,R〉adm (T ,Γ ) from premise that no attacker ofΔ is admissible
again contradicting the choice of Γ as a preferred extension.
It follows that Γ ∪Δ is conﬂict-free. This set, however, is also admissible:
att(Γ ′,Δ∪ Γ ) ⇒ [att(Γ ′,Γ ) or att(Γ ′,Δ)] ⇒ att(Γ ∪Δ,Γ ′)
Since Γ is a preferred extension Γ ∪Δ = Γ , i.e. Δ⊆ Γ and we deduce that Δ is an ideal set.
29 It is this part of the argument that requires T to be a ﬂat framework: otherwise, even if Γ and Δ are both closed, we cannot infer that Γ ∪ Δ will
also be so.
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is admissible, att(Γ,α)⇒ att(Γ,Θ) thus att(Θ,Γ ). Conversely, if no attacker, Γ of α is admissible and every such attacker
is attacked by Θ then Θ ∪ {α} is conﬂict-free. To see this, assume the contrary and that att(Θ ∪ {α},Θ ∪ {α}). Either
att(Θ ∪ {α}, {α}) or att(Θ ∪ {α},Θ). In the ﬁrst case we have,
att
(
Θ ∪ {α}, {α}) ⇒ att(Θ,Θ ∪ {α}) from premise
⇒ att(Θ, {α}) since ¬att(Θ,Θ) from admissibility ofΘ
⇒ ¬ver〈L,R〉adm (T ,Θ) from premise
contradicting Θ being the ideal extension. In the second case, since
att
(
Θ ∪ {α},Θ) ⇒ att(Θ,Θ ∪ {α})
we derive a similar contradiction. It is easy to see that Θ ∪ {α} is also admissible since every set attacking it is counterat-
tacked by Θ . Furthermore no attacker Γ of Θ ∪ {α} is admissible: either att(Γ,Θ) and Γ is not an admissible set via (a);
or att(Γ, {α}) and Γ is not admissible from the premises on α. We deduce that Θ ∪ {α} is an ideal set, and with Θ being
the ideal extension, i.e. maximal such set, so α ∈Θ . 
Corollary 7. If T = 〈T , A,– 〉 is a ﬂat framework in 〈L, R〉 and deciding Δ | ϕ is in some complexity class C , then ver〈L,R〉idl ∈ conpC .
Proof. Given an instance 〈T ,Δ〉 of ver〈L,R〉idl we may check ver〈L,R〉adm (T ,Δ) via a pC computation, as described in [10, Theo-
rem 4]. We can then test for every Γ ⊆ A that should att(Γ,Δ) (|Δ| calls to a C oracle deciding Γ | α for α ∈ Δ), then Γ
is not admissible (pC ). In total the algorithm is implemented in conppC = conpC . 
Corollary 8. The problem of verifying that Δ is an ideal set can be decided in
a. conp for lp instantiations of abfs.
b. Π p2 for dl instantiations of abfs.
Proof. All instances of abfs instantiating lp or dl describe ﬂat frameworks. Thus both bounds follow from Corollary 7 and
Table 7 giving conpp = conp for lp instances, and conpconp = conpnp =Π p2 for dl instances. 
In contrast to the upper bounds given in Corollary 8, where it is not possible to assume ﬂatness, the characterisation
from Lemma 4 may fail. In such cases one has the general upper bound,
Lemma 5. Let T = 〈T , A,– 〉 be an abf with underlying deductive system 〈L, R〉 and for which Δ | ϕ is decidable in C .
ver〈L,R〉idl ∈ conpnpnp
C
Proof. Given an instance 〈T ,Δ〉 of ver〈L,R〉idl for T = 〈T , A,– 〉 as in the lemma statement, this can be decided by checking
ver〈L,R〉adm (T ,Δ) (conpC , via [10, Theorem 3]) and then testing
∀Γ ⊆ A (¬ver〈L,R〉pr (T ,Γ )∨Δ⊆ Γ )
That is, every preferred extension of T contains Δ. Again via [10, Theorem 3], ¬ver〈L,R〉pr ∈ npnpC so the test described can
be completed in conpnp
npC
. 
Corollary 9. For ael instantiations of abfs the problem of verifying that Δ is an ideal set is in Π p4 .
Proof. Those frameworks describing ael instantiations can fail to be ﬂat, hence the upper bound is immediate from Table 7
and Lemma 5. 
The characterisation of ideal sets and properties of the ideal extension are not the only properties of afs that carry across
to ﬂat frameworks. With some minor variations it turns out that the construction process for building the ideal extension –
described in Theorem 4 – can also be adapted to ﬂat frameworks. We ﬁrst describe the algorithm for ﬂat frameworks in
Algorithm 3 and prove its correctness in Theorem 8. Finally its run-time is analysed in terms of upper bounds on ca〈L,R〉adm
and that of deciding Δ | ϕ in Theorem 9.
Prior formally to proving its correctness, some discussion of this algorithm may be helpful. In a similar manner to the
mechanism described in obtaining the upper bound of Theorem 4, the algorithm builds a partition of the assumption set
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2: Aout := {α ∈ A: ¬ca〈L,R〉adm(T ,α)};
3: Ain := A \ Aout ;
4: Aca := {α ∈ Ain: Ain | α};
5: Apsa := Ain \ Aca;
6: Γ := Apsa;
7: repeat
8: Γin := Γ ;
9: Ξ := {α ∈ Aout: ¬(Γ | α)};
10: Δ := {γ ∈ Γin: Ξ ∪ Aca | γ };
11: Γ := Γ \Δ;
12: until Γin = Γ
13: return Γ ;
Algorithm 3. Construction of the ideal extension in ﬂat abfs.
into three parts: Aout (the counterpart of Xout from Theorem 4) with the remaining assumptions (Ain) divided between
those which cannot be sceptically accepted (the set Aca) and those which could be sceptically accepted (the set Apsa).
The main loop, between ll. 7–12, progressively removes assumptions from Apsa (until no change results), by identifying
those assumptions which cannot be part of the ideal extension. The computational process, in effect, mirrors the view of
〈Xpsa,Xout〉 as a bipartite subgraph of H adopted in Theorem 4 in its treatment of 〈Apsa, Aout〉. The major difference is that
the attack relation must be considered in terms of sets of assumptions, whereas in the af algorithm it suﬃced to deal with
the interaction between individual arguments in Xout and arguments in Xpsa .30 Informally one may view the rationale of
Algorithm 3 as implicitly considering a bipartite af formed by 〈Apsa,2Aout 〉 with the attack relation containing 〈Δ,α〉 for Δ
any (minimal) subset of Aout for which Δ ∪ Aca | α; together with 〈Apsa, β〉 whenever (the current, in the sense of l. 8),
Apsa | β .
Theorem 8. Given a ﬂat framework, T , Algorithm 3 returns its ideal extension.
Proof. For T = 〈T , A,– 〉 a ﬂat framework w.r.t. the deductive system 〈L, R〉 let Θ ⊆ A be its ideal extension. First observe
that the subset Apsa computed in line 5 of the algorithm is both conﬂict-free and is such that Θ ⊆ Apsa . To see this notice
that att(Apsa, Apsa) would imply that for some γ ∈ Apsa Apsa | γ and, hence, Ain | γ contradicting γ ∈ Apsa (cf. lines 4–5).
That Θ ⊆ Apsa , follows by observing Θ∩ Aout = ∅: Θ is admissible, however, no assumption in Aout belongs to an admissible
set (line 2). Supposing, to the contrary, that Θ ∩ Aca 
= ∅ consider any α ∈ Θ ∩ Aca . By deﬁnition, α ∈ Aca implies Ain | α,
hence att(Ain,Θ) from which att(Θ, Ain) as Θ is admissible. We, therefore, can ﬁnd some δ ∈ Ain such that Θ | δ so that
Θ attacks any preferred extension, Δ of T for which δ ∈ Δ. Such a preferred extension exists by virtue of ca〈L,R〉adm (T , δ) but
then we cannot have Θ ⊆Δ contradicting the choice of Θ as the ideal extension of T . In summary Apsa is conﬂict-free and
Θ ⊆ Apsa . In addition ¬att(Apsa, Aca): if Apsa | γ for γ ∈ Aca , then att(Apsa,Γ ) for any preferred extension Γ with γ ∈ Γ
leading to the contradiction att(Ain, Apsa) as a consequence of att(Γ, Apsa).
To complete the proof of correctness it remains to show that the set Γ returned by Algorithm 3 is the maximal ad-
missible subset of Apsa . Certainly Γ is conﬂict-free (since Apsa is conﬂict-free). Consider any Ξ ⊆ A for which att(Ξ,Γ ).
It must be the case that Ξ ∩ Aout 
= ∅ for otherwise Ξ ⊆ Aca and att(Ξ,Γ ) would yield Ξ | γ for γ ∈ Γ , i.e. Ain | γ
contradicting γ ∈ Apsa . Let Ξout =Ξ ∩ Aout . If att(Γ,Ξout) then, trivially, att(Γ,Ξ), so Γ would only fail to be admissible if
it is attacked by Ξ such that ∀ξ ∈ Ξout ¬(Γ | ξ). This, however, contradicts Γ being the set returned by Algorithm 3: for
consider the subset Δ for which Ξ | δ for each δ ∈ Δ (from att(Ξ,Γ ) it is immediate that |Δ| 1). This is precisely the
subset identiﬁed in line 10 and removed (from the current Γ ) in line 11. We deduce, as a result that Γ is an admissible
subset of Apsa . It must, however, also be a maximal such set. For consider any non-empty Δ ⊆ Apsa \ Γ . We claim the set
Γ ∪Δ is not admissible. To see this let Γ0,Γ1, . . . ,Γk be the sequence of sets Γ0 = Apsa , Γk = Γ , and Γi ⊂ Γi−1 (1 i  k)
over successive iterations of lines 7–11. From Δ ∩ Γ = ∅, we can identify a partition of Δ into r sets 〈Δ1, . . . ,Δr〉 and a
subsequence 〈 j1, j2, . . . , jr〉 of 〈0,1, . . . ,k− 1〉 such that
Δi ⊆ Γ ji ; Δi ∩ Γ ji+1 = ∅
Thus, Δi is a subset of those assumptions removed from the current collection Γin = Γ ji in line 11 of the algorithm. Without
loss of generality we can focus on Δ1 and Γ j1 . By inspection we see that,
Ξ = {α ∈ Aout: ¬(Γ j1 | α )} line 9
Δ1 ⊆ {γ ∈ Γ j1 : Ξ ∪ Aca | γ } line 10
30 It may be found helpful to compare ll. 2–7 of Algorithm 1 with the construction in ll. 9–10 of Algorithm 3: line 9 identiﬁes the set Ξ of assumptions
in Aout that are unattacked (by Apsa) and eliminates from Apsa those assumptions attacked by Ξ .
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Ξ ′,Δ1). In summary, if it is the case that Γ ∪ Δ is admissible, then this set must be able to counter the attack on Δ1 by
Aca ∪Ξ ′ . Hence,
ver〈L,R〉adm (T ,Γ ∪Δ) ⇒ att(Γ ∪Δ, Aca ∪Ξ ′)
⇒ att(Γ ∪Δ, Aca) or att(Γ ∪Δ,Ξ ′)
From Γ ∪ Δ ⊆ Apsa and ¬att(Apsa, Aca) the only possibility is att(Γ ∪ Δ,Ξ ′): the deﬁnition of Γ j1 which is a superset of
Γ ∪ Δ shows that no such counterattack is possible. In total we deduce that Γ ∪ Δ cannot be admissible and, hence Γ is
the maximal admissible subset of Apsa . It is easily seen that no attacker of Γ deﬁnes an admissible set of assumptions since
att(Δ,Γ )⇒Δ∩ Aout 
= ∅.
To summarise: Θ , the ideal extension, is a subset of Apsa; Γ the set returned by Algorithm 3 is an admissible subset of
Apsa and no attacker, Δ of Γ is admissible, i.e. by Lemma 4(a) is an ideal set; Γ , however, is the maximal admissible subset
of Apsa none of whose attackers is admissible, so that Γ =Θ . 
Theorem 9. Let T = 〈T , A,– 〉 be a ﬂat framework w.r.t. 〈L, R〉 for which Δ | ϕ is decidable in C . Using Algorithm 3 the ideal
extension of T may be found in fpnpC‖ , i.e. the class of function problems that are solvable by polynomial time algorithms which make
non-adaptive queries to an oracle in npC .
Proof. The partition of A = {α1, . . . ,αn} into 〈Aout, Ain〉 can be obtained using the single parallel query which reports
z1z2 . . . zn ∈ 〈,⊥〉n with zi =  ⇔ ca〈L,R〉adm (T ,αi). From [10, Theorem 8], in the case of ﬂat frameworks with Δ | ϕ de-
cidable in C , ca〈L,R〉adm ∈ npC so that this partition is constructible in fpnpC‖ . The remaining stages of the algorithm require
only a polynomial number of adaptive queries to C oracles: an easy generalisation of [26, Theorem 2.2, p. 379] gives
fpnp
C [log] ⊆ fpnpC‖ (where fpD[log] is the class of functions computable by polynomial time algorithms that make O (logn)
queries to a D oracle on instances of size n), so that since fpC ⊆ fpnpC the overall upper bound stated follows. 
Turning to the speciﬁc cases lp and dl, the following is immediate from Theorem 9 and Table 7.
Corollary 10.
a. ﬁelp ∈ fpnp‖ .
b. ﬁedl ∈ fpΣ
p
2‖ .
c. The decision problems verlpie , ver
lp,∅
ie and ca
lp
idl are all in p
np‖ .
d. The decision problems verdlie , ver
dl,∅
ie and ca
dl
idl are all in p
Σ
p
2‖ .
The results of Corollaries 8 and 10 establish upper bounds on each of the three variants of the veriﬁcation problem,
credulous reasoning, and the complexity of constructing ideal extensions. These upper bounds rely on properties of the
supporting deductive system and the complexity of deciding Δ | ϕ . In order to address issues of lower bounds and the
complexity of the other decision problems we consider the different deductive systems in turn.
Regarding lp instantiations we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10.
a. verlpidl is conp-hard via 
p
m.
b. calpidl is p
np‖ -hard via 
rp
m with probability 1− 2−n.
c. verlpie is p
np‖ -hard via 
rp
m with probability 1− 2−n.
d. verlp,∅ie is pnp‖ -hard via 
rp
m with probability 1− 2−n.
e. ﬁelp is fpnp‖ -hard via 
p
m.
Proof. All of the lower bounds follow by giving a translation from arbitrary afs H(X ,A) to a related lp setting, i.e. in
effect, if Lid is a problem deﬁned in the ideal semantics for afs with Llpid its counterpart in abfs instantiating lp forms, then
the translation we describe forms the basis of a proof that Lid pm Llpid .
The translation we describe from H(X ,A) to a logic program TH is effectively that given in Dung [12, p. 348]. For an
af, H(X ,A) deﬁne LitsH as the set of ground atoms
LitsH = {d(x): x ∈ X}∪ {not d(x): x ∈X}
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ables).
The logic program, TH has exactly the following rules:
TH =
⋃
x∈X
⋃
y∈{x}−
{
d(x)← not d(y)}
Informally these assert that the argument x is “defeated” if any of its attackers (y ∈ {x}−) is assumed not to be defeated.
For the deductive system so deﬁned we have the abf, T H = 〈TH, AH, –〉 in which AH = {not d(x): x ∈X }, not d(x) = d(x).
Rather than derive (a)–(e) separately, it is, in fact suﬃcient to prove there is a one-to-one correspondence between ideal
sets (of arguments) in H(X ,A) and ideal sets (of assumptions) in T H . For S ⊆ X , Δ(S) ⊆ AH is the set of assumptions
{not d(y): y ∈ S}. Similarly, for Δ ⊆ AH , S(Δ) ⊆ X is the set of arguments {y: not d(y) ∈ Δ}. It is easy to see that (a)–(e)
are all immediate consequences of the following
S is an ideal set inH if and only ifΔ(S) is an ideal set in T H (3)
In order to establish (3), ﬁrst suppose that S deﬁnes an ideal set within H and consider Δ(S) ⊆ AH . The set Δ(S) is
conﬂict-free since
att
(
Δ(S),Δ(S)
) ⇔ {not d(x),not d(y)}⊆Δ(S)
and
(
d(x) ← not d(y) ∈ TH or d(y)← not d(x) ∈ TH)
⇔ {x, y} ⊆ S and (〈y, x〉 ∈A or 〈x, y〉 ∈A)
contradicting the fact that S is conﬂict-free. Similarly Δ(S) must be admissible, for given any Γ ⊆ AT , att(Γ,Δ(S)) if and
only if Γ | not d(x) = d(x) for some not d(x) ∈ Δ(S). From the deﬁnition of TH , Γ contains an assumption not d(y) for
which d(x) ← not d(y) is a rule in TH , so that 〈y, x〉 ∈ A, i.e. y ∈ X attacks x in S . It follows that there is some z ∈ S
for which 〈z, y〉 ∈ A, hence some not d(z) ∈ Δ(S) for which d(y) ← not d(z) is in TH , i.e. ΔS | not d(y) and att(Δ(S),Γ ).
Thus Δ(S) is also admissible. We recall from Lemma 1 that, since S is an ideal set, no argument in S− is credulously
accepted. We show that, in consequence, no subset Γ of assumptions for which att(Γ,Δ(S)) is admissible. This suﬃces to
complete the ﬁrst part of the proof via Lemma 4(a). So suppose att(Γ,Δ(S)) and hence Γ | not d(x) for not d(x) ∈ Δ(S),
i.e. not d(y) ∈ Γ and d(x) ← not d(y) ∈ TH so that 〈y, x〉 ∈ A. It is easy to show, however, that if Γ were admissible then
S(Γ ) = {y: not d(y) ∈ Γ } ⊆ X would be admissible in H: as y ∈ S(Γ ) ∩ S− , this contradicts the fact that no attacker of S
is credulously accepted. We deduce that if S is an ideal set in H then Δ(S) is an ideal set in T H .
For the converse implication, let Δ be an ideal set of T H and consider the subset S(Δ) of X . By similar arguments
to those above S(Δ) is an admissible set since Δ is admissible. Now consider any attacker y of some x ∈ S(Δ). In T H
any set of assumptions, Γ containing not d(y) attacks not d(x) ∈ Δ by virtue of the rule d(x) ← not d(y) in TH , thus, from
Lemma 4(a) it follows that no such set can be admissible in T H , i.e. the argument y is not credulously accepted in H. Thus
S(Δ) is an admissible set of H none of whose attackers is credulously accepted: from Lemma 1, S(Δ) is therefore an ideal
set. 
We now consider lower bounds for abfs instantiating default logics. The proof methods are built on techniques from
work of Gottlob [25] (which also feature in the treatment of default logics in Dimopoulos, Nebel, and Toni [10]), the char-
acterisation of ideal sets from Lemma 4, and the approach adopted in the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 11. verdlidl is Π
p
2 -complete.
Proof. That verdlidl ∈ Π p2 has already been shown in Corollary 8(b). To show that this problem is Π p2 -hard, we reduce to
the complementary problem, ¬verdlidl from the Σ p2 -complete problem qsatΣ2 . We assume instances are 3-dnf formulae
with product terms {P1, P2, . . . , Pm} each comprising exactly three literals deﬁned over two (disjoint) sets of propositional
variables Yn = 〈y1, . . . , yn〉; Zn = 〈z1, . . . , zn〉, an instance ϕ(Yn, Zn) being accepted if there is some assignment, αY , of Yn ,
under which ϕ(α, Zn)≡ .
Given, ϕ(Yn, Zn) form the default theory (W , D) over the language whose literals are
L0 = {yi, zi,¬yi,¬zi: 1 i  n} ∪ {ϕ,¬ϕ,ψ,¬ψ}
[Note: The terms {ϕ,¬ϕ,ψ,¬ψ} are treated as literals in this language, so that ϕ is effectively a “place-holder” for the dnf
expression P1 ∨ · · · ∨ Pm over literals of Zn ∪ Yn , e.g. as in the second set of default rules below.]
We ﬁx W = ∅ and D to contain the following default rules31:
31 Readers familiar with default logic will note that these do not deﬁne a normal set of defaults. There are, however, general translation mechanisms, cf.
[25, p. 414], that can be used to build equivalent semi-normal default theories from arbitrary defaults. In order to minimise notational overheads we have
eschewed such translation in our presentation.
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yi
,
 : M¬yi
¬yi ,
 : Mψ
yi
,
 : Mψ
¬yi : 1 i  n
}
{ : Mψ
¬ϕ ,
 : Mϕ
¬ψ ,
 : M(¬P1 ∧¬P2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Pm)
¬ϕ
}
The abf instance formed from (W , D) is Tϕ = 〈∅, Aϕ, –〉 with
Aϕ = {Myi,M¬yi: 1 i  n} ∪ {Mϕ,Mψ} ∪
{
M(¬P1 ∧¬P2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Pm)
}
We recall that the contrary mapping is Mα = ¬α.
We claim that {Mψ} does not deﬁne an ideal set within Tϕ if and only if ϕ(Yn, Zn) is a positive instance of qsatΣ2 . We
ﬁrst observe that {Mψ} deﬁnes an admissible set of assumptions from Aϕ . For consider any Δ ⊂ Aϕ for which att(Δ, {Mψ}).
This can only happen if Δ | ¬ψ , from which it follows that Mϕ ∈ Δ and hence (since {Mψ} | ¬ϕ) it follows that
att({Mψ},Δ). Given that {Mψ} is admissible, in order for it to fail to be an ideal set, via Lemma 4(a), some Δ ⊆ Aϕ
for which att(Δ,Mψ) must deﬁne an admissible set within T . We have already argued that any set attacking {Mψ} must
contain the assumption Mϕ so it suﬃces to show that cadladm(T ,Mϕ) if and only if ∃αY : ϕ(αY , Zn)≡ .
Suppose ﬁrst that cadladm(T ,Mϕ) and let Γ ⊆ Aϕ be a preferred extension of T for which Mϕ ∈ Γ . Certainly if Mψ ∈ Δ
then att(Δ,Γ ), however from {Mϕ} | ¬ψ such attacks are countered. From Mϕ ∈ Γ , any set of assumptions, Δ, for which
M(¬P1 ∧¬P2 ∧· · ·∧¬Pm) ∈Δ will also attack Γ so that Γ | ¬(¬P1 ∧· · ·∧¬Pm)≡ P1 ∨· · ·∨ Pm . In consequence, Γ must
contain n assumptions (one for each pair {Myi,M¬yi}), Γ ′ , such that Γ ′ | P1 ∨ · · · ∨ Pm . It is easily seen that choosing
αY = 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 to be the corresponding assignment of Yn , i.e. ai :=  ⇔ Myi ∈ Γ ′ gives ϕ(αY , Zn)≡ .
For the converse implication supposing that some αY satisﬁes ϕ(αY , Zn) ≡ . Consider the set of assumptions Γ =
{Myi: ai = } ∪ {M¬yi: ai = ⊥} ∪ {Mϕ}. It is certainly the case that ¬att(Γ,Γ ). Furthermore the only Δ attacking Γ are
those containing Mψ (which is counterattacked through {Mϕ} | ¬ψ ), M¬yi (for those yi with ai = : counterattacked via
{Myi} | yi); Myi (for those yi with ai = ⊥: counterattacked by {M¬yi} | ¬yi), and, ﬁnally, M(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Pm)
(which is counterattacked by the premise that ϕ(αY , Zn)≡  so that Γ | P1 ∨ · · · ∨ Pm).
In summary, cadladm(T ,Mϕ) if and only if ϕ(Yn, Zn) is accepted as an instance of qsatΣ2 , hence ¬verdlidl(T , {Mψ}) if and
only if ∃αY ϕ(αY , Zn)≡ . We deduce that verdlidl(T , {Mψ}) is Π p2 -complete. 
Corollary 11.
a. cadlidl is Π
p
2 -hard.
b. verdl,∅ie is Σ
p
2 -hard.
c. verdlie is d
p
2 -hard, where d
p
2 is the set of languages expressible as the intersection of a language in Σ
p
2 with a language in Π
p
2 .
d. ﬁedl is fp
Σ
p
2‖ -complete.
Proof. Similar to the arguments used in Theorem 1(b–d): for (a), cadlidl(T ,Mψ) using the abf of Theorem 11 if and only
if ϕ(Yn, Zn) deﬁnes a negative instance of qsatΣ2 . To establish (b), T either has an empty ideal extension or its ideal
extension is {Mψ}, so that ¬verdl,∅ie (T ) if and only if verdlidl(T , {Mψ}). Finally (c) follows by considering instances 〈ϕ1,ϕ2〉
of the canonical dp2 -complete problem, qsat
Σ
2 –qsat
Π
2 , applying the translation to an abf described above and choosing the
ideal extension to be veriﬁed as {Mψ2}.
For (d) the upper bound has been proven in Corollary 10(b). The lower bound uses the construction given in Theorem 11
and a similar argument to that of Theorem 4. Instead of Sat Collection we use the fp
Σ
p
2‖ -complete problem of computing the
sequence of values describing if ϕi(Y in, Z
i
n) is accepted as instance of qsat
Π
2 for n separate instances 〈ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . , ϕn〉. 
The lower bounds results of Corollary 11 (Π p2 -hardness for credulous reasoning, Σ
p
2 -hardness for verifying if the empty
set deﬁnes the ideal extension, and dp2 -hardness on verifying if an arbitrary set of assumptions is the ideal extension), as
with the initial bounds proved in afs for the related problems – Theorem 1(b–d) – are some distance from the upper bound
p
Σ
p
2‖ on these which is an immediate consequence of Corollary 10(b). In order to reduce this gap, in the af setting, we
made use of a number of structural complexity results from Chang et al. [6,7] (Facts 3, 4) together with properties of the
unique satisﬁability problem (usat) established in Valiant and Vazirani [34]. Given that our approach with dl instantiations
of abfs mirrors many of the ideas applied in the analysis of afs, a natural tactic in closing this gap would be to exploit
similar methods. To this end it is helpful to observe that the structural characterisation of pnp‖ -hard languages from Chang
and Kadin [6] leading to Fact 3, is through a simulation of oracle computations and does not explicitly depend on the oracle
itself being from np. We thus obtain32
32 We have chosen to state this generalisation in terms of classes Σ pk and Π
p
k within the polynomial hierarchy – which are the cases of interest for our
later development – rather than arbitrary complexity classes C. We further note that the “only if” part is not needed in the subsequent treatment.
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p
k‖ -complete if all of the following hold.
F1. L ∈ pΣ
p
k‖ .
F2. L is Σ pk -hard and L is Π
p
k -hard.
F3. L has property and2 .
F4. L has property orω .
In order to amplify the lower bounds of Corollary 11 to p
Σ
p
2‖ -hardness, Fact 5 suggests an approach, analogous to the
devices discussed in the commentary following the proof of Theorem 6, namely
S1. Prove that cadlidl is Σ
p
2 -hard (noting that we already know it to be Π
p
2 -hard).
S2. Prove that cadlidl has property and2.
S3. Prove that cadlidl has property orω .
We deal with S2 and S3 in Theorems 12 and 13.
Theorem 12. cadlidl has property and2 .
Proof. We restrict attention to instances 〈〈T , A,– 〉,Mα〉 for Mα ∈ A. In this case it suﬃces to show that given instances
〈T1,Mα1〉 and 〈T2,Mα2〉 of cadlidl we can form an instance 〈U ,Mβ〉 for which
cadlidl(U,Mβ) if and only if cadlidl(T1,Mα1)∧ cadlidl(T2,Mα2)
Let 〈〈T1, A1,– 〉,Mα1〉 and 〈〈T2, A2,– 〉,Mα2〉 be instances of cadlidl where, without loss of generality, the underlying languages
L1 and L2 are disjoint.33 Let 〈W1, D1〉 and 〈W2, D2〉 be the default theories from which T1 and T2 are deﬁned. Deﬁne U
to be the abf built from the default theory 〈W1 ∪ W2, D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D〉 where D is a new set of defaults over new literals
〈y1, y2, z〉 and
D =
{ : Mα1
¬y1 ,
 : Mα2
¬y2 ,
 : Mz
z
,
 : M(y1 ∨ y2)
¬z
}
〈U , B, –〉 with U = T1 ∪ T2, B = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ {Mz,M(y1 ∨ y2)}. We claim that
cadlidl(U,Mz) ⇔ cadlidl(T1,Mα1)∧ cadlidl(T2,Mα2)
Suppose that 〈U ,Mz〉 deﬁnes a positive instance of cadlidl and let ΘU be the ideal extension of U . From att({M(y1 ∨
y2)}, {Mz}) we obtain att(ΘU , {M(y1 ∨ y2)}), i.e. ΘU | ¬(y1 ∨ y2) ≡ ¬y1 ∧ ¬y2. It follows, therefore, that {Mα1,Mα2} ⊂
ΘU . The ideal extension of U is, however, Θ1 ∪Θ2 ∪ {Mz} (where Θi is the ideal extension of Ti), so that from A1 ∩ A2 = ∅
it follows Mα1 ∈Θ1 and Mα2 ∈ Θ2.
For the converse direction, assume that Mα1 ∈ Θ1 and Mα2 ∈Θ2 (so that cadlidl(T1,Mα1)∧ cadlidl(T2,Mα2)) and consider
Θ1∪Θ2∪{Mz} ⊂ B . This set is admissible: ¬att(Θ1∪Θ2∪{Mz},Θ1∪Θ2∪{Mz}); if Γ ⊆ B is such that att(Γ,Θ1∪Θ2∪{Mz})
then one of att(Θ1,Γ ), att(Θ2,Γ ) or att(Γ, {Mz}) must hold. In the last of these Γ | ¬z so that M(y1∨ y2) ∈ Γ . Now from
{Mα1,Mα2} ⊆ Θ1 ∪ Θ2 we obtain the counterattack {Mα1,Mα2} | ¬y1 ∧ ¬y2. It is easily seen that ¬cadladm(U , {M(y1 ∨
y2)}): Mα1 ∈ Θ1 and Mα2 ∈ Θ2 so that for every preferred extension Δ1 of T1 and every preferred extension Δ2 of T2,
{Mα1,Mα2} ⊆ Δ1 ∪ Δ2 | ¬(y1 ∨ y2). We deduce that Θ1 ∪ Θ2 ∪ {Mz} is an admissible set none of whose attackers is
admissible, so that via Lemma 4, this is an ideal set hence, cadlidl(U ,Mz). 
Theorem 13. cadlidl has property orω .
Proof. We use a similar construction to that of Theorem 12: given{〈T1,Mα1〉, . . . , 〈Tk,Mαk〉}
a set of k instances of cadlidl with Ti = 〈Ti, Ai, –〉 deﬁned from default theories 〈Wi, Di〉, we form the default theory (W , D)
with
W =
k⋃
i=1
Wi; D = D ′ ∪
k⋃
i=1
Di
33 This can always be guaranteed by renaming the literal terms in each.
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D ′ =
{ : Mz
z
,
 : My
¬z ,
 : Mα1
¬y , . . . ,
 : Mαk
¬y
}
We denote by U the abf capturing this default theory and ﬁx the instance of cadlidl to be 〈U ,Mz〉. With this instance it is
not hard to show that
k∨
i=1
cadlidl(Ti,Mαi) ⇔ cadlidl(U,Mz) 
From the constructions of Theorems 12 and 13, in order to improve the lower bounds obtained to p
Σ
p
2‖ -hard, we need to
show that cadlidl is Σ
p
2 -hard. Faced with the related issue (proving np-hardness of caidl) in af settings, we used a reduction
from usat combined with properties of a randomised reduction from sat to usat, i.e. the approach described in Fact 4,
Theorem 7. There are two methods we might attempt to use in adapting these techniques to proving cadlidl to be Σ
p
2 -hard.
Deﬁne the quantiﬁer, ∃! to hold whenever a witnessing solution is unique, e.g. usat is then the language whose positive
instances are those for which ∃!α: ϕ(α). Consider the following two formulations of “unique satisﬁability” for the second
level of ph,
usat∃,12 ∃αY ∃!βZ ϕ(αY , βZ )≡ 
usat∃,22 ∃!αY ∀βZ ϕ(αY , βZ )≡ 
Given the result of Marx [30, Theorem 5], showing the ﬁrst of these to be Σ p2 -complete, one might attempt to prove
usat∃,12 
p
m ca
dl
idl . Unfortunately, attempts to translate the form of usat
∃,1
2 into a simulating default theory turn out to be
problematic34: the device used earlier to map multiple satisfying assignments (or unsatisﬁability) to non-membership of
an argument in the ideal extension, fails with the form ∃αY ∃!βZ ϕ(αY , βZ ) since it is unable to deal with two (or more)
assignments of Yn all of which reduce ϕ to a cnf having a unique satisfying assignment.
We ﬁrst show that if we consider the form described in the second variant – which we will now denote by usat∃2, i.e.
the language of formulae ϕ(Yn, Zn) for which ∃!αY ∀βZ ϕ(αY , βZ ) – then usat∃2 pm cadlidl . We then address the question of
Σ
p
2 -hardness for usat
∃
2.
It should be noted that we do not assume instances of usat∃2 to be in a normal form.
Theorem 14. usat∃2 
p
m ca
dl
idl .
Proof. Let ϕ(Yn, Zn) be an instance of usat∃2. Consider the following instance – 〈Tϕ,Mw〉 – of cadlidl , in which Tϕ =〈Tϕ, Aϕ, –〉. First form the default theory 〈Wϕ, Dϕ〉 over the literals
{yi,¬yi, zi,¬zi, xi,¬xi: 1 i  n} ∪ {w,¬w,ϕ,¬ϕ}
with Wϕ = ∅ and Dϕ = D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3 where,
D1 =
{ : Myi
yi
,
 : M¬yi
¬yi ,
 : Myi
¬xi ,
 : M¬yi
¬xi ,
 : Mxi
¬w ,
 : Mxi
¬xi : 1 i  n
}
D2 =
{ : M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn))
yi
,
 : M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn))
¬yi : 1 i  n
}
D3 =
{ : Mw
w
,
 : Mϕ
ϕ
,
 : M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn))
ϕ(Yn, Zn)
,
 : M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn))
¬ϕ
}
Note that we distinguish ϕ(Yn, Zn) the propositional formula presented as an instance of usat∃2 from ϕ a formal literal in the
constructed default theory (Wϕ, Dϕ). The abf Tϕ then has Tϕ = ∅ and
Aϕ = {Myi,M¬yi,Mxi: 1 i  n} ∪
{
Mϕ,Mw,M
(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn))}
with Mα = ¬α for each Mα ∈ Aϕ .
The instance of cadlidl formed is 〈Tϕ,Mw〉.
34 This is, perhaps, unsurprising: a close inspection of Marx’ proof indicates that were it possible directly to prove usat∃,12 
p
m ca
dl
idl then it is likely that
one could directly derive qsatΣ2 
p
m ca
dl
idl thereby obviating any need to consider a generalisation of usat for the second level of the Polynomial Hierarchy.
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as an instance of cadlidl .
Let α = 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 ∈ 〈⊥,〉n be the unique assignment of Yn that witnesses ϕ(Yn, Zn) as a positive instance of usat∃2.
Consider the subset Γα of Aϕ given by
Γα = {Myi: ai = } ∪ {M¬yi: ai = ⊥} ∪ {Mϕ,Mw}
We ﬁrst note that Γα deﬁnes an admissible subset of Aϕ . It is it clear that ¬att(Γα,Γα). Consider any Δ ⊆ Aϕ for which
att(Δ,Γα). If Myi ∈Δ (resp. M¬yi ∈ Δ) for some M¬yi (resp. Myi) in Γα then such attacks are countered since {M¬yi} |
¬yi and {Myi} | yi . If Mxi ∈ Δ (so that Δ | ¬w) then we either have Myi ∈ Γα or M¬yi ∈ Γα so that Γα | ¬xi . Finally,
if M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn)) ∈Δ so that Δ | ¬ϕ since α is such that ϕ(α, Zn)≡  we obtain
Γα | ϕ(Yn, Zn)= M
(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn))
To complete the ﬁrst part of the proof it remains only to show that no subset, Δ of Aϕ for which att(Δ,Γα), is admissible,
whence via Lemma 4(a), it follows that 〈Tϕ,Mw〉 is accepted as an instance of cadlidl . Thus, consider any Δ for which
att(Δ,Γα). From the earlier discussion showing that Γα is admissible we have the following possibilities.
D1. Δ∩ {M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn)),Mx1, . . . ,Mxn} 
= ∅.
In this case att(Δ,Δ): Δ | M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn)) (from D3) or Δ | Mxi (from D1) so that Δ cannot be admissible.
D2. M¬yi ∈Δ for some Myi ∈ Γα .
In order for Δ to be admissible, we must have Δ | M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn)). This, however, implies that there is an assignment
β = β1, . . . , βn of Yn for which ϕ(β, Zn)≡  so contradicting the premise that α is the unique such assignment of Yn .
We deduce that if ϕ(Yn, Zn) is a positive instance of usat∃2 then 〈Tϕ,Mw〉 is a positive instance of cadlidl .
On the other hand suppose that, Θϕ the ideal extension of Tϕ contains the assumption Mw . Then Θϕ contains exactly
one assumption from {Myi,M¬yi} for each 1  i  n (at least one in order that Θϕ | ¬xi is needed since {Mxi} | ¬w;
at most one since {Myi,M¬yi} cannot be belong to Θϕ ). Without loss of generality suppose that {My1, . . . ,Myn} ⊂ Θϕ .
Since {M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn))} | ¬yi we deduce that Θϕ | M(¬ϕ(Yn, Zn)), i.e. that the assignment αY in which yi :=  for each
i is such that ϕ(αY , Zn) ≡ . Furthermore, from the fact that no subset Γ of Aϕ having att(Γ,Θϕ) can be admissible, we
deduce that αY is the unique instantiation of Yn with ϕ(αY , Zn) ≡ . Hence if 〈Tϕ,Mw〉 is accepted as instance of cadlidl
then ϕ(Yn, Zn) is accepted as an instance of usat∃2. 
Improvements to the lower bounds of Corollary 11 are established as a consequence of the following result.
Theorem 15. qsatΣ2 
rp
m usat
∃
2 with probability 1/4n.
Proof. The detailed argument is presented in Appendix A. 
Corollary 12.
a. cadlidl is p
Σ
p
2‖ -complete via 
rp
m with probability 1− 2−n.
b. verdl,∅ie is p
Σ
p
2‖ -complete via 
rp
m with probability 1− 2−n.
c. verdlie is p
Σ
p
2‖ -complete via 
rp
m with probability 1− 2−n.
Proof. Noting that membership in p
Σ
p
2‖ for each case has already been shown and recalling the earlier arguments of Corol-
lary 11, it suﬃces to prove only (a).
Consider the p
Σ
p
2‖ -complete problem35 orω(qsatΣ2 − qsatΠ2 ) instances of which comprise n pairs of cnf formulae –〈ϕi(Ym, Zm),ψi(Vm,Wm)〉 – over disjoint sets of variables (so the instance involves 4nm distinct variables in total). Such
an instance being accepted if there is at least one pair 〈ϕi(Ym, Zm),ψi(Vm,Wm)〉 for which ϕi(Ym, Zm) is accepted as an
instance of qsatΣ2 , i.e. ∃αY ¬ϕi(αY , Zm)≡  and ψi(Ym, Zm) is accepted as an instance of qsatΠ2 , i.e. ∀αY ∃βZ ψi(αY , βZ ).
Choosing uniformly at random one of the n pairs in such an instance immediately yields
orω
(
qsatΣ2 − qsatΠ2
)
rpm qsatΣ2 – qsatΠ2 with probability 1/n
35 That the given problem is indeed p
Σ
p
2‖ -complete is an easy generalisation of the methods used to establish orω(sat–unsat) is pnp‖ -complete.
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Complexity of ideal semantics in abfs relative to randomised reductions.
Decision problem Complexity rpm probability
calpadm np-complete 1
cadladm Σ
p
2 -complete 1
calpidl p
np‖ -complete 1− 2−n
cadlidl p
Σ
p
2‖ -complete 1− 2−n
salppr Π
p
2 -complete 1
sadlpr Π
p
3 -complete 1
verlpidl conp-complete 1
verdlidl Π
p
2 -complete 1
verlpie p
np‖ -complete 1− 2−n
verdlie p
Σ
p
2‖ -complete 1− 2−n
From Theorem 15,
qsatΣ2 − qsatΠ2 rpm usat∃2 − qsatΠ2 with probability 1/4n
so that combining Corollary 11(a) and Theorem 14 gives
orω
(
qsatΣ2 − qsatΠ2
)
rpm and2
(
cadlidl
)
with probability 1/4n2
Hence, via Theorem 12,
orω
(
qsatΣ2 − qsatΠ2
)
rpm cadlidl with probability 1/4n2
Finally, applying Fact 4 and Theorem 13 we obtain
orω
(
qsatΣ2 − qsatΠ2
)
rpm cadlidl with probability 1− 2−n
from which (a) is immediate. 
Table 9 summarises the results of this section for abfs in a similar style to that of Table 5 for afs.
5. Conclusions and further work
We have considered the computational complexity of decision and search problems arising in the ideal semantics of
Dung et al. [14,15], addressing both the af model of Dung [12] and ﬂat frameworks within the abf approach of Bondarenko
et al. [4].
It has been shown that for settings in which credulous reasoning can be carried out in a complexity class C , the prin-
cipal computational problems of interest can be resolved within pC‖ or its functional analogue fpC‖ : classes believed to lie
strictly below conpC the complexity of sceptical reasoning in such environments. We have, in addition, presented compelling
evidence that deciding if an argument is acceptable under the ideal semantics, if a set of arguments deﬁnes the ideal ex-
tension, and if the ideal extension is empty, are not contained within any complexity class falling strictly within pC‖ : all of
these problems being pC‖ -hard with respect to 
rp
m reductions of probability 1 − 2−n . Although this complexity class com-
pares unfavourably with the C and coC-complete status of related questions under the credulous preferred semantics, it
represents an improvement on the conpC-completeness level of similar issues within the sceptical preferred semantics.
Given that sceptical acceptance is a precondition of membership in an ideal set this reduction in complexity may ap-
pear surprising. If we consider the af cases, the apparent discrepancy is, however, accounted for by examining the second
condition that a set of arguments must satisfy in order to form an ideal set: as well as being sceptically accepted, the set
must be admissible. This condition plays a signiﬁcant role in the complexity shift. An important reason why testing sceptical
acceptance of a given argument x fails to belong to conp (assuming conp 
= Π p2 ) is that the condition “no attacker of x is
credulously accepted” while necessary for sceptical acceptance of x is not suﬃcient: a fact which seems ﬁrst to have been
observed by Vreeswijk and Prakken [35] in their analysis of sound and complete proof procedures for credulous accep-
tance. Although this condition is suﬃcient in coherent frameworks, deciding if H is coherent is already Π p2 -complete [19].
In contrast, as demonstrated in the characterisation of ideal sets given in Lemma 1, an admissible set, S , is also sceptically
accepted if and only if no argument in S− – i.e. attacker of S – is credulously accepted: we thus have a condition which
can be tested in conp. With an analogous characterisation of ideal sets also holding in ﬂat assumption based frameworks –
Lemma 4 – a similar reduction in complexity is obtained.
The reason why ﬁnding the ideal extension (and consequently decision questions predicated on its properties, e.g. car-
dinality, membership, etc.) can be performed more eﬃciently than testing sceptical acceptance stems from the fact this
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framework only requires determining the set, Xout , of arguments which are not credulously accepted, so that explicit con-
sideration of sceptical acceptance is never required. Although a direct representation of the structures as a bipartite graph
is not employed, the analogous partition of assumptions in ﬂat abfs affords a similar device by which explicit testing of
sceptical acceptance is avoided.
This paper has focused on the graph-theoretic abstract argumentation framework model from Dung [12] and instan-
tiations of ﬂat assumption based frameworks, e.g. those realising lp and dl theories. Of the questions left open in ideal
semantics, possibly, the most challenging concerns the computational complexity of problems in non-ﬂat abfs, in particular
those realising ael. Of these it would be of some interest to demonstrate, as we conjecture is indeed the case, that veri-
fying a set of assumptions as an ideal set is Π p4 -hard in ael settings, thereby giving an exact bound. A ﬁnal collection of
issues concern the performance of Algorithm 3 as a practical mechanism for constructing the ideal extension. Thus Dung et
al. [15] describe dialectic approaches for identifying the ideal extension using a variation of a procedure described in [13].
To what extent the methods of Algorithm 3 can be used to complement or offer an effective alternative is a question of
some interest.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 15
We recall that Theorem 15 asserts
qsatΣ2 
rp
m usat
∃
2 with probability 1/4n.
The proof of this is based on the fact that Valiant and Vazirani’s randomised reduction from sat to usat [34] exploits a
combinatorial property of arbitrary subsets S of the n-dimensional vector space 〈0,1〉n formed via the operations {⊕,∧}36
and randomly chosen elements from this, i.e. it does not explicitly depend on satisﬁability per se.
In our subsequent discussion, we view assignments to a set of n propositional variables as n-tuples from 〈0,1〉n . Given
x= 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 ∈ 〈0,1〉n
y = 〈y1, y2, . . . , yn〉 ∈ 〈0,1〉n
the inner product w.r.t. {⊕,∧} of x and y (denoted x · y) is the value in 〈0,1〉 given by,
x · y =
n⊕
i=1
(xi ∧ yi)
The reduction from sat to usat in [34] builds on the following result.
Fact 6. (See [34, Theorem 2.4, p. 89].) Let S ⊆ 〈0,1〉n and w1,w2, . . . ,wn be chosen uniformly at random from 〈0,1〉n. For each
1 i  n, deﬁne Si to be the set
Si =
{
v ∈ S:
i∧
j=1
(v · w j = 0)
}
Furthermore, let Pn(S) be the probability that, for some i  n, |Si | = 1. Then Pn(S) 1/4.
The main device needed is a mechanism for manipulating the structure of formulae in order to exploit Fact 6. This is
achieved in the following development of [34, Lemma 2.1, p. 88], where the notion of a set of candidates for an instance
ϕ(Yn, Zn) of qsatΣ2 – denoted C(ϕ) – is deﬁned as
C(ϕ)= {α ∈ 〈0,1〉n: ∀β ∈ 〈0,1〉n, ϕ(α,β) = 1}
Note the set of candidates is well-deﬁned irrespective of the exact form taken by ϕ , i.e. it is not required that ϕ be either
in cnf or dnf: we restrict attention, however, to formulae deﬁned over the logical basis {∧,∨,¬}.
Lemma 6. Let ϕ(Yn, Zn) be a formula deﬁning an instance of qsatΣ2 and let w1,w2, . . . ,wk be elements of 〈0,1〉n.
36 That is the vector space GF[2]n : the operation ⊕ being Boolean “exclusive–or”, i.e. x⊕ y = 1 if and only if x 
= y.
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∀α ∈ C(ψk)
k∧
i=1
(α · wi = 0)
b. Givenψk one may construct in polynomial time a formula over the basis {∧,∨,¬}, χk(Yn ∪Um, Zn) using variables Yn ∪ Zn ∪Um
for some value of m such that deﬁning
C(χk)=
{
γ ∈ 〈0,1〉n+m: ∀β χ(γ ,β) = 1}
Then there exists some 〈γn+1, . . . , γn+m〉 ∈ 〈0,1〉m for which
〈α1,α2, . . . ,αn, γn+1, γn+2, . . . , γn+m〉 ∈ C(χk)
if and only if 〈α1,α2, . . . ,αn〉 ∈ C(ψk).
Proof. Given ϕ(Yn, Zn) as deﬁned in the lemma statement and 〈w1, . . . ,wk〉 from 〈0,1〉n , deﬁne the formula ψk(Yn, Zn) to
be ϕ(Yn, Zn)∧ωk(Yn) where,
ω1(Yn)=
(
1⊕
⊕
j: w1, j=1
y j
)
for i = 1
ωi(Yn)=ωi−1 ∧
(
1⊕
⊕
j: wi, j=1
y j
)
for i > 1
Notice that C(ψk)⊆ C(ϕ) since,
C(ψk)=
{
α: ψk(α, Yn)≡ 1
}
= {α: ϕ(α, Yn)≡ 1}∩ {α: ωk(α)= 1}
⊆ {α: ϕ(α, Yn)≡ 1}= C(ϕ)
Furthermore, any such α must satisfy ωk(α)= 1, so that for each 1 i  k (1⊕⊕ j: wi, j=1 y j), it follows that( ⊕
j: wi, j=1
y j
)
(α)= 0
i.e. wi · y = 0. This establishes part (a).
For part (b), with ϕ(Yn, Zn) assumed already to be over the logical basis {∧,∨,¬} to convert ψk to a formula χ of this
form it suﬃces to observe that only the sub-formula ωk (involving the operation ⊕) is not in the required form. Furthermore
ωk consists of a conjunction of terms Q i each having the form
1⊕ yi1 ⊕ yi2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yim
for some subset {yi1 , . . . , yim } of Yn . Without loss of generality it suﬃces to show that 1 ⊕ y1 ⊕ y2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ym may be
eﬃciently translated to a formula, χ(Ym ∪ Um−1) using only operations from {∧,∨,¬}.
Note that if m = 0 no translation is needed; and if m = 1 then 1⊕ y1 ≡ ¬y1, so we may assume m 2. Introducing new
variables {u1,u2, . . . ,um−1}, χ(Yn ∪ Um−1) is formed from(
u1 ↔ (y1 ⊕ y2)
)∧ (u2 ↔ (u1 ⊕ y3))∧ · · · ∧ (um−1 ↔ (um−2 ⊕ ym))∧ (um−1 ⊕ 1)
Since (
x↔ (y ⊕ z))≡ (1⊕ x⊕ y ⊕ z)
≡ (¬x⊕ y ⊕ z)
≡ (¬x∨ y ∨ z)(¬x∨¬y ∨¬z)(x∨ y ∨¬z)(x∨¬y ∨ z)
this conversion can be performed in polynomial time without introducing further new variables. Letting χk(Yn ∪Um, Zn) be
the formula resulting by translating ψk(Yn, Zn)= ϕ(Yn, Zn)∧ωk(Yn) in this way, it remains only to note that any candidate
〈α1,α2, . . . ,αn, γn+1, γn+2, . . . , γn+m〉 of χk(Yn ∪ Um, Zn) maps to a unique candidate (〈α1,α2, . . . ,αn〉) of ψk(Yn, Zn) and
that for 〈α1,α2, . . . ,αn〉 ∈ C(ψk) there is some choice of 〈γn+1, γn+2, . . . , γn+m〉 for which
〈α1,α2, . . . ,αn, γn+1, γn+2, . . . , γn+m〉 ∈ C(χk) 
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deals with satisfying assignments of ϕ(Xn) instead of the notion of candidates of ϕ(Yn, Zn).
Proof of Theorem 15. Given ϕ(Yn, Zn) an instance of qsatΣ2 choose (uniformly at random) a value k in {1,2, . . . ,n} and
then (also uniformly at random) k n-tuples w1,w2, . . . ,wk from 〈0,1〉n . The instance of usat∃2 constructed is the formula
χk(Yn ∪ Um, Zn) of Lemma 6.
To see that ϕ(Yn, Zn) is accepted as an instance of qsatΣ2 if and only if χk(Yn ∪ Um, Zn) is accepted as an instance of
usat∃2, ﬁrst observe that if ϕ(Yn, Zn) fails to deﬁne a positive instance of qsatΣ2 , i.e. C(ϕ) = ∅, then χk can never deﬁne a
positive instance of usat∃2: in this case C(χk)= ∅.
On the other hand, if |C(ϕ)| = t > 0, then from Fact 6, given n randomly chosen elements, 〈w1,w2, . . . ,wn〉 from 〈0,1〉n ,
we know that with probability at least 1/4 there is a choice of k ∈ {1,2,3, . . . ,n} such that∣∣∣∣∣
{
v ∈ C(ϕ):
k∧
i=1
(v · wi = 0)
}∣∣∣∣∣= 1
Hence the correct choice of k (in forming χk) is made with probability (at least) 1/n, from which it follows that with
probability at least 1/4n exactly one such candidate will survive as a member of C(χk). In consequence χk will be accepted
as an instance of usat∃2. 
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